MANOLO P. FULE, Petitioner, v. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, Respondent; G.R. No. 79094. June 22, 1988
RATIONALE:
Under the rule of statutory construction, negative words and phrases are to be regarded as mandatory while those in the affirmative are merely directory (McGee v. Republic, 94 Phil. 820 [1954]).
The use of the term "shall" further emphasizes its mandatory character and means that it is imperative, operating to impose a duty which may be enforced (Bersabal v. Salvador, No. L-35910, July 21, 1978)
FACTS:
1. The petitioner was convicted of violation of BP blg. 22 based on the stipulation of facts during the pre-trial conference which states that:
on January 21, 1981, the accused Fule (herein petitioner), an agent of the Towers Assurance Corp., issued and made out check No. 26741, dated January 24, 1981 in the sum of P2,541.05 to Roy Nadera in remittance of collection. The check was presented for payment on January 24, 1981 but it was dishonored because the checking account was already closed. The accused was identified to be Manolo Fule.
2. The trial court convicted the petitioner-appellant based on the prosecution's evidence since the petitioner-appellant also waived the right to present evidence in the subsequent hearing and, in lieu thereof, submitted a Memorandum confirming the Stipulation of Factsi
3. On appeal, the Appellate Court upheld the Stipulation of Facts and affirmed the judgment of conviction.
ISSUE:
Whether the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the decision of the Regional Trial Court convicting the petitioner of the offense charged, despite the fact that the basis of the conviction was based solely on the stipulation of facts made during the pre-trial on August 8, 1985, which was not signed by the petitioner, nor by his counsel.
RULING:
YES. The CA erred in affirming the lower court's ruling.
1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, Rulle 118
SEC. 4. Pre-trial agreements must be signed. — No agreement or admission made or entered during the pre-trial conference shall be used in evidence against the accused unless reduced to writing and signed by him and his counsel.
By its very language, the Rule is mandatory. Under the rule of statutory construction, negative words and phrases are to be regarded as mandatory while those in the affirmative are merely directory (McGee v. Republic, 1954). The use of the term "shall" further emphasizes its mandatory character and means that it is imperative, operating to impose a duty which may be enforced (Bersabal v. Salvador, No. L-35910, July 21, 1978). And more importantly, penal statutes whether substantive and remedial or procedural are, by consecrated rule, to be strictly applied against the government and liberally in favor of the accused (People v. Terrado, No. L-23625, November 25, 1983, 125 SCRA 648).
Since the signature of the accused and his counsel, as mandatorily required by the Rules, the Stipulation of Facts is inadmissible in evidence. The fact that the lawyer of the accused confirmed the Stipulation of Facts does not cure the defect because Rule 118 requires both the accused and his counsel to sign the Stipulation of Facts.
Hence, the ruling of CA is reversed. Case is re-opened and remanded to the lower court for further reception of evidence.
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What the prosecution should have done, upon discovering that the accused did not sign the Stipulation of Facts, as required by Rule 118, was to submit evidence to establish the elements of the crime, instead of relying solely on the supposed admission of the accused in the Stipulation of Facts. Without said evidence independent of the admission, the guilt of the accused cannot be deemed established beyond reasonable doubt.
Consequently, under the circumstances obtaining in this case, the ends of justice require that evidence be presented to determine the culpability of the accused. When a judgment has been entered by consent of an attorney without special authority, it will sometimes be set aside or reopened (Natividad v. Natividad, 51 Phil. 613 [1928])
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