G.R. No. 190293 March 20, 2012
PHILIP SIGFRID A. FORTUN and ALBERT LEE G. ANGELES, Petitioners,
vs.
GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, as Commander-in-Chief and President of the Republic of the Philippines, EDUARDO ERMITA, Executive Secretary, ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES (AFP), or any of their units, PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE (PNP), or any of their units, JOHN DOES and JANE DOES acting under their direction and control, Respondents.
and 6 other petitions challenging the constitutionality of Presidential Proclamation No. 1959.
TOPIC: LEGAL STANDING
FACTS:
1. This is a petition "for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and writs of prohibition and preliminary prohibitory injunction (1) to declare Proclamation No. 1959 or any act, directive or order arising from or connected to it as unconstitutional, and (2) to enjoin public respondents from further enforcing the same."
2009
1. November 24: President Macapagal-Arroyo issued Presidential Proclamation 1946 declaring a state of emergency in Maguindanao, Sultan Kudarat, and Cotabato City to prevent and suppress similar lawless violence in Central Mindanao after the carnage of 57 innocent civilians on a highway in Maguindanao, allegedly led by the Ampatuan family, which happened the day before the said proclamation.
2. December 04: Believing that she needed greater authority to put order in Maguindanao and secure it from large groups of persons that have taken up arms against the constituted authorities in the province, she issued Presidential Proclamation 1959 declaring martial law and suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in that province except for identified areas of the Moro Islamic Liberation Front.
3. December 06: Arroyo submitted her report to Congress in accordance with Section 18, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution.
4. December 09: Congress in joint session review the validity of said action.
5. December 12: before Congress could act, the President issued Presidential Proclamation 1963, lifting martial law and restoring the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in Maguindanao.
6. Petitioners Philip Sigfrid A. Fortun and the other petitioners in G.R. 190293, 190294, 190301,190302, 190307, 190356, and 190380 brought the present actions to challenge the constitutionality of President Arroyo’s Proclamation 1959 affecting Maguindanao. But, given the prompt lifting of that proclamation before Congress could review it and before any serious question affecting the rights and liberties of Maguindanao’s inhabitants could arise, the Court deems any review of its constitutionality the equivalent of beating a dead horse since:
ONE: President Arroyo withdrew her proclamation of martial law and suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus before the joint houses of Congress could fulfill their automatic duty to review and validate or invalidate the same.
TWO: Since President Arroyo withdrew her proclamation of martial law and suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in just eight days, they have not been meaningfully implemented. The military did not take over the operation and control of local government units in Maguindanao. The President did not issue any law or decree affecting Maguindanao that should ordinarily be enacted by Congress. No indiscriminate mass arrest had been reported. Those who were arrested during the period were either released or promptly charged in court. Indeed, no petition for habeas corpus had been filed with the Court respecting arrests made in those eight days. The point is that the President intended by her action to address an uprising in a relatively small and sparsely populated province. In her judgment, the rebellion was localized and swiftly disintegrated in the face of a determined and amply armed government presence.
7. Thus, the Court DISMISSED the consolidated petitions on the ground that the same have become moot and academic.
8. As discussed in Justice Carpio's DISSENTING OPINION, the OSG argued that the phrase "any citizen" in Section 18, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution must be read in conjunction with the phrase "appropriate proceeding." Since petitioners deemed the original actions for certiorari and prohibition as the appropriate proceeding referred to in Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution, petitioners must satisfy the requirements under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, one of which is the institution of the action by the aggrieved party. The OSG pointed out that none of the petitioners qualify as an aggrieved party.
ISSUE:
Whether petitioners possess legal standing to challenge the constitutionality of Proclamation No. 1959.
JUSTICE CARPIO:
YES. The petitioners have the legal standing / locus standi to file the present petitions assailing the sufficiency of the factual basis of Proclamation No. 1959.
Legal standing or locus standi has been defined as a personal and substantial interest in the case such that the party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the governmental act that is being challenged.
In case of a suit questioning the sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation of martial law or suspension of the writ, such as here, Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution expressly provides:
The Supreme Court may review, in an appropriate proceeding filed by any citizen, the sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or the extension thereof, and must promulgate its decision thereon within thirty days from its filing.
It is clear that the Constitution explicitly clothes "any citizen" with the legal standing to challenge the constitutionality of the declaration of martial law or suspension of the writ. The Constitution does not make any distinction as to who can bring such an action.
As discussed in the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission, the "citizen" who can challenge the declaration of martial law or suspension of the writ need not even be a taxpayer. This was deliberately designed to arrest, without further delay, the grave effects of an illegal declaration of martial law or suspension of the writ, and to provide immediate relief to those aggrieved by the same. Accordingly, petitioners, being Filipino citizens, possess legal standing to file the present petitions assailing the sufficiency of the factual basis of Proclamation No. 1959.
Moreover, given the transcendental importance of the issues raised in the present petitions, the Court may relax the standing requirement and allow a suit to prosper even where there is no direct injury to the party claiming the right of judicial review.18 The Court has held:
Notwithstanding, in view of the paramount importance and the constitutional significance of the issues raised in the petitions, this Court, in the exercise of its sound discretion, brushes aside the procedural barrier and takes cognizance of the petitions, as we have done in the early Emergency Powers Cases, where we had occasion to rule:
‘x x x ordinary citizens and taxpayers were allowed to question the constitutionality of several executive orders issued by President Quirino although they [involved] only an indirect and general interest shared in common with the public. The Court dismissed the objection that they were not proper parties and ruled that ‘transcendental importance to the public of these cases demands that they be settled promptly and definitely, brushing aside, if we must, technicalities of procedure.’ We have since then applied the exception in many other cases.19 (Emphasis supplied)
Comments
Post a Comment