BUENASEDA et al VS SECRETARY Juan Flavier et al; G.R. No. 106719 September 21, 1993

RATIONALE:

Under the rule of Noscitor a sociis, the word "suspension" should be given the same sense as the other words with which it is associated. Where a particular word is equally susceptible of various meanings, its correct construction may be made specific by considering the company of terms in which it is found or with which it is associated (Co Kim Chan v. Valdez Tan Keh, 75 Phil. 371 [1945]; Caltex (Phils.) Inc. v. Palomar, 18 SCRA 247 [1966]).chanroblesvirtualawlibra


FACTS:

1. The Ombudsman, in its January 7, 1992 order, directed the preventive suspension of herein petitioners:

- Dr. Brigida S. Buenaseda, Chief of Hospital III;

- Isabelo C. Banez, Jr., Administrative Officer III;

- Conrado Rey Matias, Technical Assistant to the Chief of Hospital;

- Cora C. Solis, Accountant III; and

- Enya N. Lopez, Supply Officer III, all of the National Center for Mental Health

after Director Raul Arnaw and Investigator Amy de Villa-Rosero recommended their preventive suspension in connection with the administrative complaint for their alleged violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.

2. On December 09, 1992, the Solicitor General commented on the Petition, Supplemental Petition and Supplemental Manifestation, stated that

(a) "The authority of the Ombudsman is only to recommend suspension and he has no direct power to suspend;" and

(b) "Assuming the Ombudsman has the power to directly suspend a government official or employee, there are conditions required by law for the exercise of such powers; [and] said conditions have not been met in the instant case"

3. This position was adopted by the petitioners in their January 25, 1993 pleading.  Petitioners also refuted private respondents' motion to disbar petitioners' counsel and to cite them for contempt 

4. They filed a petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus, with Prayer for Preliminary Injunction or Temporary Restraining Order, under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court. They also asked for an order directing the Ombudsman to disqualify Director Raul Arnaw and Investigator Amy de Villa-Rosero, of the Office of the Ombudsman, from participation in the preliminary investigation of the charges against petitioners.

Respondents

OSG and petitioners

The power of preventive suspension given the Ombudsman under Section 24 of R.A. No. 6770 was contemplated by Section 13 (8) of Article XI of the 1987 Constitution, which provides that the Ombudsman shall exercise such other power or perform such functions or duties as may be provided by law

under the 1987 Constitution, the Ombudsman can only recommend to the heads of the departments and other agencies the preventive suspension of officials and employees facing administrative investigation conducted by his office. Hence, he cannot order the preventive suspension himself.

Section 13(3) of the 1987 Constitution (power, function, and duty of the Ombudsman)

Direct the officer concerned to take appropriate action against a public official or employee at fault, and recommend his removal, suspension, demotion, fine, censure or prosecution, and ensure compliance therewith.


ISSUE:

Whether the Ombudsman has the power to suspend government officials and employees working in offices other than the Office of the Ombudsman, pending the investigation of the administrative complaints filed against said officials and employees


RULING:

YES. The Ombudsman has the power to suspend government officials and employees not specifically under the Office of the Ombudsman in administrative complaints.


The Solicitor General argues that under Section 13(3) of the 1987 Constitution, the Ombudsman has three distinct powers, namely:
(1) direct the officer concerned to take appropriate action against public officials or employees at fault;
(2) recommend their removal, suspension, demotion, fine, censure, or prosecution; and
(3) compel compliance with the recommendation

However, this would be misleading since the Ombudsman imposed not a punitive but only a preventive suspension.

When the Constitution vested on the Ombudsman the power "to recommend the suspension" of a public official or employees (Sec. 13 [3]), it referred to "suspension," as a punitive measure. All the words associated with the word "suspension" in said provision referred to penalties in administrative cases, e.g. removal, demotion, fine, censure. Under the rule of Noscitor a sociis, the word "suspension" should be given the same sense as the other words with which it is associated. Where a particular word is equally susceptible of various meanings, its correct construction may be made specific by considering the company of terms in which it is found or with which it is associated (Co Kim Chan v. Valdez Tan Keh, 75 Phil. 371 [1945]; Caltex (Phils.) Inc. v. Palomar, 18 SCRA 247 [1966]).

Section 24 of R.A. No. 6770, which grants the Ombudsman the power to preventively suspend public officials and employees facing administrative charges before him, is a procedural, not a penal statute. The preventive suspension is imposed after compliance with the requisites therein set forth, as an aid in the investigation of the administrative charges.

The need for the preventive suspension may arise from several causes, among them, the danger of tampering or destruction of evidence in the possession of respondent; the intimidation of witnesses, etc. The Ombudsman should be given the discretion to decide when the persons facing administrative charges should be preventively suspended.

The purpose of R.A. No. 6770 is to give the Ombudsman such powers as he may need to perform efficiently the task committed to him by the Constitution. Such being the case, said statute, particularly its provisions dealing with procedure, should be given such interpretation that will effectuate the purposes and objectives of the Constitution. Any interpretation that will hamper the work of the Ombudsman should be avoided.

Thus, petition is DISMISSED.


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The Ombudsman Law advisedly deleted the words "subordinate" and "in his bureau," leaving the phrase to read "suspend any officer or employee under his authority pending an investigation . . . ." The conclusion that can be deduced from the deletion of the word "subordinate" before and the words "in his bureau" after "officer or employee" is that the Congress intended to empower the Ombudsman to preventively suspend all officials and employees under investigation by his office, irrespective of whether they are employed "in his office" or in other offices of the government. The moment a criminal or administrative complaint is filed with the Ombudsman, the respondent therein is deemed to be "in his authority" and he can proceed to determine whether said respondent should be placed under preventive suspension.chanroblesvirtualawlibraryc


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Additional info:

The Motion for Disbarment charges the lawyers of petitioners with:

(1) unlawfully advising or otherwise causing or inducing their clients - petitioners Buenaseda, et al., to openly defy, ignore, disregard, disobey or otherwise violate, maliciously evade their preventive suspension by Order of July 7, 1992 of the Ombudsman . . ."; (2) "unlawfully interfering with and obstructing the implementation of the said order (Omnibus Submission, pp. 50-52; Rollo, pp. 259-260); and (3) violation of the Canons of the Code of Professional Responsibility and of unprofessional and unethical conduct "by foisting blatant lies, malicious falsehood and outrageous deception" and by committing subornation of perjury, falsification and fabrication in their pleadings (Omnibus Submission, pp. 52-54; Rollo, pp. 261-263).

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