TOPIC: Legislative intent
GIST:
Soccoro recorded Garcia's defamatory words against her when the latter made a confrontation. She used the recording in a civil case against Garcia but Garcia filed a case against Soccoro for violation of R.A. 4200.
SC found her guilty regardless of her being one of the participants in the conversation since the law was clear to punish "any" person who secretly recorded a conversation unauthorized by all parties.
RATIONALE:
Legislative intent is determined principally from the language of the statute.
The unambiguity of the express words of the provision, taken together with the above-quoted deliberations from the Congressional Record, therefore plainly supports the view held by the respondent court that the provision seeks to penalize even those privy to the private communications. Where the law makes no distinctions, one does not distinguish.
[P]etitioner’s contention that the phrase “private communication” in Section 1 of R.A. 4200 does not include “private conversations” narrows the ordinary meaning of the word “communication” to a point of absurdity.
Any doubts about the legislative body's meaning of the phrase "private communication" are, furthermore, put to rest by the fact that the terms "conversation" and "communication" were interchangeably used by Senator Tañada in his Explanatory Note to the bill.
FACTS:
1. Petitioner Ramirez made a secret recording of the conversation that was part of a civil case filed in the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City alleging that the private respondent, Ester S. Garcia, vexed, insulted and humiliated her in a “hostile and furious mood” and in a manner offensive to petitioner’s dignity and personality,” contrary to morals, good customs and public policy.” Ramirez was called "bastos, bobo, and walang utak," and that without Ester's help, she wouldn't have been hired in the hotel.
2. Garcia then filed a criminal case before the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City for violation of Republic Act 4200, entitled “An Act to prohibit and penalize wire tapping and other related violations of private communication, and other purposes.” Ramirez filed a Motion to Quash the Information. The trial court granted the said motion. The private respondent filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari with the Supreme Court, which referred the case to the Court of Appeals in a Resolution. Respondent Court of Appeals promulgated its decision declaring the trial court’s order as null and void after subsequently denied the motion for reconsideration by the petitioner.
ISSUEs:
1. Whether the party sought to be penalized by the statute ought to be a party other than or different from those involved in the private communication.
2. Whether the substance or content of the conversation must be alleged in the Information.
3. Whether R.A. 4200 penalizes the taping of a "private communication," not a "private conversation"
RULING:
1. NO. Any person not authorized to record will be penalized, even he/she is one of the participants. Sec. 1. of R.A. 4200 provides: "It shall be unlawful for any person, not being authorized by all the parties to any private communication or spoken word, to tap any wire or cable, or by using any other device or arrangement, to secretly overhear, intercept, or record such communication or spoken word by using a device commonly known as a dictaphone or dictagraph or dictaphone or walkie-talkie or tape recorder, or however otherwise described."
The said provision apparently makes it illegal for ANY person not authorized by all the parties to any private communication to secretly record such communication by means of a tape recorder. The law makes no distinction as to whether the party sought to be penalized by the statute ought to be a party other than or different from those involved in the private communication. The statute's intent to penalize all persons unauthorized to make such recording is underscored by the use of the qualifier "any". Consequently, as respondent Court of Appeals correctly concluded, "even a (person) privy to a communication who records his private conversation with another without the knowledge of the latter (will) qualify as a violator" 13 under this provision of R.A. 4200.
Since Soccoro recorded the confrontation without Garcia's consent, her act constituted a violation of R.A. 4200, notwithstanding her participation is such exchanges.
2. NO. The substance or nature of conversation is immaterial. R.A. 4200 penalizes the acts of secretly overhearing, intercepting or recording private communications by means of the devices enumerated therein. The mere allegation that an individual made a secret recording of private communication by means of a tape recorder would suffice to constitute an offense under Section 1 of R.A. 4200.
Soccoro secretly recorded their exchanges. Thus, she committed an offense under said act.
3. NO, both terms are construed to have the same meaning. Soccoro's contention that the phrase "private communication" in Section 1 of R.A. 4200 does not include "private conversations" narrows the ordinary meaning of the word "communication" to a point of absurdity. The word communicate comes from the latin word communicare, meaning "to share or to impart." In its ordinary signification, communication connotes the act of sharing or imparting signification, communication connotes the act of sharing or imparting, as in a conversation, 15 or signifies the "process by which meanings or thoughts are shared between individuals through a common system of symbols (as language signs or gestures)
This was settled when Senator Tañada used the terms "communication" and "conversation" interchangeably in his Explanatory Note to the bill.
SC ruling: The instant petition is hereby DENIED. The decision appealed from is AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.
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ADDITIONAL INFO:
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