NOBLEJAS

NOBLEJAS v TEEHANKEE 23 SCRA 405

April 29, 1968 crime: approving or recommending approval of subdivision, consolidation, and consolidated-subdivision plans covering areas greatly   in excess   of the areas covered by the original titles.

Principle: Petition for writ of prohibition with preliminary injunction

FACTS: 

1. Petition for a writ of prohibition with preliminary injunction to restrain the Secretary of Justice from investigating the official actuations of the Commissioner of Land Registration, and to declare inoperative his suspension by the Executive Secretary pending investigation.

2. Antonio   H.   Noblejas   is   the   duly   appointed,   confirmed   and qualified Commissioner of Land Registration.

3. By the terms of section   2   of   RA   1151,   the   said   Commissioner   is   declared "entitled to the same compensation, emoluments and privileges as those of a Judge of the Court of First Instance."P19,000.00."

4. On   March   7,   1968,   Sec   of   Justice   Teehankee   coursed   to Noblejas   a   letter   requiring   him   to   explain   in   writing   why   no disciplinary   action   should   be   taken   against   petitioner   for "approving   or   recommending   approval   of   subdivision,consolidation and consolidated-subdivision plans covering areas greatly   in   excess   of   the   areas   covered   by   the   original   titles.

5. Noblejas answered and apprised the Secretary of Justice that, as   he   enjoyed   the   rank,   privileges,   emoluments   and compensation of a Judge of the Court of First Instance, he could only be suspended and investigated in the same manner as a Judge of the Courts of First Instance, and, therefore, the papers relative to his case should be submitted to the Supreme Court, for action thereon conformably to section 67 of the Judiciary Act(R. A. No. 296) and Revised Rule 140 of the Rules of Court.- On March 17, 1968,

6. Noblejas received a communication signed by   the   Executive   Secretary,   "by   authority   of   the   President",

whereby,   based   on   "finding   that   a  prima   facie  case   exists against you for gross negligence and conduct prejudicial to the public interest", petitioner was "hereby suspended, upon receipt hereof, pending investigation of the above charges."-

On March 18, 1968, petitioner applied to this Court, reiterating the contentions advanced in his letter to the Secretary of Justice, claiming lack of jurisdiction and abuse of discretion, and praying for restraining writs.

In their answer respondents admit the facts but denied that petitioner, as Land Registration Commissioner , exercises   judicial   functions,   or   that   the   petitioner   may   be considered a Judge of First Instance within the purview of the Judiciary Act and Revised Rules of Court 140;

that the function of investigating charges against public officers is administrative or executive in nature; that the Legislature may not charge the judiciary   with   non-judicial   functions   or   duties   except   when reasonably   incidental   to   the   fulfillment   of   judicial   duties,   as   it would be in violation of the principle of the separation of powers.

ISSUE:

whether or not the   Commissioner of   Land   Registration may only be investigated by the   Supreme   Court,   in view of the conferment upon him by RA 1151 and Appropriation Laws of the rank and privileges of a Judge of the Court of First Instance.

 HELD:

section 67 of the Judiciary Act... recites that "No District Judge shall be separated or removed from office by the President of the Philippines unless sufficient cause shall exist in the judgment of the Supreme Court .

petitioner's theory that the grant of "privileges of a Judge of First Instance" includes by implication the right to be investigated only by the Supreme Court and to be suspended or removed upon its recommendation, would necessarily result in the same... right being possessed by a variety of executive officials upon whom the Legislature had indiscriminately conferred the same privileges

To adopt petitioner's theory, therefore, would mean... placing upon the Supreme Court the duty of investigating and disciplining all these officials whose functions are plainly executive, and the consequent curtailment by mere implication from the Legislative grant, of the President's power to discipline and remove...

 

administrative officials who are presidential appointees, and which the Constitution expressly place under the President's supervision and control (Constitution, Art. VII), sec l0[l]):...

if the Legislature had really intended to include in the general grant of "privileges" or "rank and privileges of Judges of the Court of First Instance" the right to be investigated by the Supreme Court, and to be suspended or removed only upon recommendation of that Court, then such grant of privileges would be unconstitutional, since it would violate the fundamental doctrine of separation of powers, by charging this court with the administrative function of supervisory... control over executive officials, and simultaneously reducing pro tanto the control of the Chief Executive over such officials.

the resolution of a consulta by a Register of Deeds is a judicial function, as contrasted with administrative process. It will be noted that by specific provision of the section, the decision of the Land Registration

Commissioner "shall be conclusive and binding upon all Registers of Deeds" alone, and not upon other parties. This limitation[1] in effect identifies the resolutions of the Land Registration Commissioner with those of any other bureau director, whose... resolutions or orders bind his subordinates alone. That the Commissioner's resolutions are appealable does not prove that they are not administrative

RULE:

Conformably to the well-known principle of statutory construction that statutes should be given, whenever possible, a meaning that will not bring them in conflict with the Constitution, 

 We are constrained to rule that the grant by Republic Act 1151 to the Commissioner of Land Registration of the "same privileges as those of a Judge of the Court of First Instance" did not include, and was not intended to include, the right to demand investigation by the Supreme Court, and to be suspended or removed only upon that Court’s recommendation; for otherwise, the said grant of privileges would be violative of the Constitution and be null and void. Consequently, the investigation and suspension of the aforenamed Commissioner pursuant to sections 32 and 34 of the Civil Service Law (R.A. 2260) are neither abuses of discretion nor acts in excess of jurisdiction.

WHEREFORE, the writs of prohibition and injunction applied for are denied, and the petition is ordered dismissed. No costs