CUES:
RA 4790 and its one-subject one title
violation, and INDIVISIBLE provisions
BARA
LIDASAN (taxpayer, resident of Cotabato vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS,
respondent.
G.R.
No. L-28089 October 25, 1967
SANCHEZ,
J.:
|
We
are not unmindful of the rule, buttressed on reason and of long standing,
that where a portion of a statute is rendered unconstitutional and the
remainder valid, the parts will be separated, and the constitutional portion
upheld. Black, however, gives the exception to this rule, thus: .
. . But when the parts of the statute are so mutually dependent and
connected, as conditions, considerations, inducements, or compensations for
each other, as to warrant a belief that the legislature intended them as a
whole, and that if all could not be carried into effect, the legislature
would not pass the residue independently, then, if some parts are
unconstitutional, all the provisions which are thus dependent, conditional,
or connected, must fall with them,11 |
FACTS
1.
June
18, 1966, the Chief Executive signed into law House Bill 1247, known as Republic Act 4790,
now in dispute. The body of the statute, reproduced in haec verba, reads:
Sec.
1. Barrios Togaig, Madalum, Bayanga, Langkong, Sarakan, Kat-bo, Digakapan,
Magabo, Tabangao, Tiongko, Colodan, Kabamakawan, Kapatagan, Bongabong, Aipang,
Dagowan, Bakikis, Bungabung, Losain, Matimos and Magolatung, in the
Municipalities of Butig and Balabagan, Province of Lanao del Sur, are separated
from said municipalities and constituted into a distinct and independent
municipality of the same province to be known as the Municipality of Dianaton,
Province of Lanao del Sur. The seat of government of the municipality shall be
in Togaig.
2.
That
barrios Togaig and Madalum just mentioned are within the municipality of
Buldon, Province of Cotabato, and that Bayanga, Langkong, Sarakan, Kat-bo,
Digakapan, Magabo, Tabangao, Tiongko, Colodan and Kabamakawan are parts and
parcel of another municipality, the municipality of Parang, also in the
Province of Cotabato and not of Lanao del Sur.
3.
Comelec
adopted its resolution of August 15, 1967, the
pertinent portions of which are:
For
purposes of establishment of precincts, registration of voters and for other
election purposes, the Commission RESOLVED that pursuant to RA 4790, the new
municipality of Dianaton, Lanao del Sur shall comprise the barrios of
Kapatagan, Bongabong, Aipang, Dagowan, Bakikis, Bungabung, Losain, Matimos, and
Magolatung situated in the municipality of Balabagan, Lanao del Sur, the
barrios of Togaig and Madalum situated in the municipality of Buldon, Cotabato,
the barrios of Bayanga, Langkong, Sarakan, Kat-bo, Digakapan, Magabo, Tabangao,
Tiongko, Colodan and Kabamakawan situated in the municipality of Parang, also
of Cotabato.
4.
September
7, 1967, the Office of the President, through the Assistant Executive
Secretary, recommended to Comelec that the operation of the statute be suspended until "clarified
by correcting legislation."
5.
Comelec
stood by its own interpretation, declared
that the statute "should be implemented unless declared unconstitutional
by the Supreme Court."
6.
Petitioner
herein prays that Republic Act 4790 be declared unconstitutional; and that
Comelec's resolutions of August 15, 1967 and September 20, 1967 implementing
the same for electoral purposes, be nullified
ISSUE
Is
Republic Act 4790, which is entitled "An Act Creating the Municipality of
Dianaton in the Province of Lanao del Sur", but which includes barrios
located in another province — Cotabato — to be spared from attack planted upon
the constitutional mandate that "No bill which may be enacted into law
shall embrace more than one subject which shall be expressed in the title of
the bill"?
RULING: YES
1.
The
constitutional provision contains dual limitations upon legislative power.
First. Congress is to refrain from conglomeration, under one statute, of
heterogeneous subjects. Second. The title of the bill is to be couched in a
language sufficient to notify the legislators and the public and those
concerned of the import of the single subject thereof
-
Suggestion
was made that Republic Act 4790 may
still be salvaged with reference to the nine barrios in the municipalities
of Butig and Balabagan in Lanao del Sur,
with the mere nullification of the portion thereof which took away the twelve
barrios in the municipalities of Buldon and Parang in the other
province of Cotabato. The reasoning advocated is that the limited title of the
Act still covers those barrios actually in the province of Lanao del Sur.
2.
We
are not unmindful of the rule, buttressed on reason and of long standing, that where a portion of
a statute is rendered unconstitutional and the remainder valid, the parts will
be separated, and the constitutional portion upheld. Black,
however, gives the exception to this rule, thus:
. . . But when the parts of the statute are so
mutually dependent and connected, as conditions, considerations,
inducements, or compensations for each other, as to warrant a belief that the
legislature intended them as a whole, and that if all could not be carried into effect, the legislature would not pass
the residue independently, then, if some parts are unconstitutional, all the provisions which are thus
dependent, conditional, or connected, must fall with them,
In
substantially similar language, the same exception is recognized in the jurisprudence
of this Court, thus:
The general
rule is that where part of a statute is void, as repugnant to the Organic Law,
while another part is valid, the valid portion if separable from the invalid,
may stand and be enforced. But in order to do this, the valid portion must be
so far independent of the invalid portion that it is fair to presume that the
Legislature would have enacted it by itself if they had supposed that they
could not constitutionally enact the other. . . Enough must remain to make a
complete, intelligible, and valid statute, which carries out the legislative
intent. . . . The language used in the invalid part of the statute can have no
legal force or efficacy for any purpose whatever, and what remains must express
the legislative will independently of the void part, since the court has no
power to legislate.
3.
WHY
CAN’T THE PROVISIONS WHICH ARE NOT UNCONSTITUTIONAL CANNOT STAND ALONE?
Could the observations as to progressive community,
large aggregate population, collective income sufficient to maintain an
independent municipality, still apply to
a motley group of only nine barrios out of the twenty-one? Is it fair to
assume that the inhabitants of the said remaining barrios would have agreed
that they be formed into a municipality, what with the consequent duties and liabilities
of an independent municipal corporation? Could they stand on their own feet
with the income to be derived in their community? How about the peace and
order, sanitation, and other corporate obligations? This Court may not supply
the answer to any of these disturbing questions. And yet, to remain deaf to
these problems, or to answer them in the negative and still cling to the rule
on separability, we are afraid, is to impute to Congress an undeclared will.
Republic Act 4790 is thus
indivisible, and it is accordingly null and void in its totality.
DECISION
We vote to declare Republic Act 4790
null and void, and to prohibit respondent Commission from implementing the same
for electoral purposes.
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