Gashem Shookat Baksh vs. Court of Appeals 219 SCRA 115 (1993)

 FACTS:

The respondent, Marilou T. Gonzales 20 years old, single, Filipino and a pretty lass of good moral character and reputation duly respected in her community; on the other hand petitioner, Gashem Shookat Baksh, is an Iranian citizen residing at Lozano Apartments, Guilig, Dagupan City, and is an exchange student taking a medical course at the Lyceum Northwestern Colleges in Dagupan City, before

August 20, 1987 the latter courted and proposed to marry her, she accepted his love on the condition

that they get married; they therefore agreed to get married. The petitioner forced her to live with him in

the Lozano apartments. She was a virgin at that time. A week before the filing of complaint, petitioner’s

attitude towards her started to change. He maltreated and threatened to kill her. At the confrontation

before the representative of the barangay captain of Guilig, Petitioner repudiated their marriage

agreement because he was already married to someone living in Bacolod. Respondent thus filed a

complaint for damages against petitioner.


ISSUE:

Whether or not Article 21 of the Civil Code applies to the case at bar.


HELD: 

The existing rule is that a breach of promise to marry per se is not an actionable wrong.

Notwithstanding, Article 21, which is designed to expand the concepts of torts and quasi-delicts in this jurisdiction by granting adequate legal remedy for the untold number of moral wrongs which is  impossible for human foresight to specifically enumerate and punish in the statute books.  

In the light of the above laudable purpose of Article 21, the court held that where a man’s promise to marry in fact the proximate cause of the acceptance of his love by a woman and his representation to  fulfill that promise thereafter becomes the proximate cause of the giving of herself unto him in sexual  congress, proof that he had, in reality, no intention of marrying her and that the promise was only subtle  scheme or deceptive device to entice or inveigle her to accept him and obtain her consent to sexual act  could justify the award of damages pursuant to Article 21 not because of such breach of promise of  marriage but because of the fraud and deceit behind it, and the willful injury to her honor and  reputation which followed thereafter. It is essential however, that such injury should have been  committed in a manner contrary to morals, good customs, or public policy.

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