G.R.
No. 208566 November 19,
2013
GRECO
ANTONIOUS BEDA B. BELGICA JOSE M. VILLEGAS JR. JOSE L. GONZALEZ REUBEN M.
ABANTE and QUINTIN PAREDES SAN DIEGO, Petitioners,
vs.
HONORABLE
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY PAQUITO N. OCHOA JR. SECRETARY OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT
FLORENCIO B. ABAD, NATIONAL TREASURER ROSALIA V. DE LEON SENATE OF THE
PHILIPPINES represented by FRANKLIN M. DRILON m his capacity as SENATE
PRESIDENT and HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES represented by FELICIANO S. BELMONTE,
JR. in his capacity as SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE, Respondents.
PERLAS-BERNABE,
J.:
|
Any of the multifarious
unconstitutional methods and mechanisms should never again be adopted in any
system of governance, by any name or form, by any semblance or similarity, by
any influence or effect. PDAF 2013 is
unconstitutional as it violates principles of separation of powers,
non-delegability of legislative power, principles of checks and balances,
provisions against political dynasties, and authority and power of local
autonomy.
|
FACTS
1. Consolidated petitions were
filed in the Court under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, all of which
assail the constitutionality of the Pork Barrel System.
2.
In
the Philippines, "Pork Barrel"
has been commonly referred to as lump-sum, discretionary funds of Members of
the Legislature.
3.
Differing
from previous PDAF Articles but similar to the CDF Articles, the 2011 PDAF
Article included an express statement on lump-sum amounts allocated for
individual legislators and the Vice-President: Representatives were given ₱70
Million each, broken down into ₱40 Million for "hard projects" and
₱30 Million for "soft projects"; while ₱200 Million was given to each
Senator as well as the Vice-President, with a ₱100 Million allocation each for
"hard" and "soft projects."
4.
In
the 2012 and
2013 PDAF Articles, it is stated that the "identification of projects and/or designation of beneficiaries shall
conform to the priority list, standard or design prepared by each implementing
agency (priority list requirement) x x x." However, as practiced, it
would still be the individual legislator
who would choose and identify the project from the said priority list.
5.
Over
the decades, "pork" funds in the Philippines have increased
tremendously, owing in no small part to previous Presidents who reportedly used the "Pork Barrel" in order to
gain congressional support
6.
The
investigation was spawned by sworn affidavits of six (6) whistle-blowers who
declared that JLN Corporation – "JLN"
standing for Janet Lim Napoles (Napoles) – had swindled billions of pesos
from the public coffers for "ghost projects" using no fewer than 20 dummy NGOs for an entire decade.
7.
August 16, 2013, the Commission on Audit
(CoA) released the results of a three-year audit investigation covering the use
of legislators' PDAF from 2007 to 2009,
or during the last three (3) years of the Arroyo administration.
8. Report
No. 2012-03
Among others: ● Eighty-Two (82) NGOs
entrusted with implementation of seven hundred seventy two (772) projects
amount to ₱6.156 Billion were either found questionable, or submitted questionable/spurious
documents, or failed to liquidate in whole or in part their utilization of the
Funds.
ISSUES:
Based
on the pleadings, and as refined during the Oral Arguments, the
following are the main issues for the Court‘s resolution:
I.
Procedural Issues.
II. Substantive Issues on the
"Congressional Pork Barrel." [RELATED TO TOPIC]
Whether or not the 2013 PDAF Article
and all other Congressional Pork Barrel Laws similar thereto are
unconstitutional considering that they violate the principles of/constitutional
provisions on (a) separation of powers; (b) non-delegability of legislative
power; (c) checks and balances; (d) accountability; (e) political dynasties;
and (f) local autonomy.
III. Substantive Issues on the "Presidential
Pork Barrel."
RULING: PETITIONS ARE PARTLY GRANTED
II. Substantive Issues on the
"Congressional Pork Barrel." [RELATED TO TOPIC]
Whether
or not the 2013 PDAF Article and all other Congressional Pork Barrel Laws
similar thereto are unconstitutional considering that they violate the
principles of/constitutional provisions on (a) separation of powers; (b)
non-delegability of legislative power; (c) checks and balances; (d)
accountability; (e) political dynasties; and (f) local autonomy.
1.
COURT DEFINED PORK BARREL
SYSTEM.
Court defines the Pork Barrel System as
the collective body of rules and practices that govern the manner by which
lump-sum, discretionary funds, primarily intended for local projects, are
utilized through the respective participations of the Legislative and Executive
branches of government, including its members. The Pork Barrel System
involves two (2) kinds of lump-sum discretionary funds:
First, there is the Congressional
Pork Barrel which is herein defined as a kind of lump-sum, discretionary
fund wherein legislators, either individually or collectively organized into
committees, are able to effectively control certain aspects of the fund’s
utilization through various post-enactment measures and/or practices. In
particular, petitioners consider the PDAF, as it appears under the 2013 GAA, as
Congressional Pork Barrel since it is, inter alia, a post-enactment measure
that allows individual legislators to wield a collective power; and
Second, there is the Presidential
Pork Barrel which is herein defined as a kind of lump-sum, discretionary
fund which allows the President to determine the manner of its utilization.
2.
THE COURT EXPLAINED THE
SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES ON THE CONGRESSIONAL PORK BARREL.
i.
Separation of Powers
-
The
principle of separation of powers and its concepts of autonomy and independence
stem from the notion that the powers of government must be divided to avoid
concentration of these powers in any one branch; the division, it is hoped,
would avoid any single branch from lording its power over the other branches or
the citizenry.
-
The
enforcement of the national budget, as primarily contained in the GAA, is
indisputably a function both constitutionally assigned and properly entrusted
to the Executive branch of government.
-
Thus,
unless the Constitution provides otherwise, the Executive department should
exclusively exercise all roles and prerogatives which go into the
implementation of the national budget as provided under the GAA as well as any
other appropriation law.
-
The
Legislative branch of government, much more any of its members, should not
cross over the field of implementing the national budget since, as earlier
stated, the same is properly the domain of the Executive. ." Upon approval
and passage of the GAA, Congress‘ law -making role necessarily comes to an end
and from there the Executive‘s role of implementing the national budget begins.
Any post-enactment congressional measure x x x should be limited to scrutiny
and investigation
|
Arguments
on Congressional Pork Barrel 2013 PDAF |
|
|
PETITIONERS:
They state that the findings and recommendations in the CoA Report provide
"an illustration of how absolute and definitive the power of legislators
wield over project implementation in complete violation of the constitutional
principle of separation of powers." |
RESPONDENTS:
They counter that the separations of powers principle has not been violated
since the President maintains "ultimate authority to control the
execution of the GAA and that he "retains the final discretion to
reject" the legislators‘ proposals. |
-
Under
the 2013 PDAF Article, the statutory authority of legislators to identify
projects post-GAA may be construed from the import of Special Provisions 1 to 3
as well as the second paragraph of Special Provision 4.
-
Special
Provision 1 – Congress to identify PDAF projects as long as they are on the
lists
-
Special
Provision 2 – within 90 days, implementing agencies should submit a more
detailed priority list
-
Special
Provision 3 – clarifies projects to be identified by legislators
-
Special
Provision 4 – any modification and revision of the project shall be submitted
to the House Committee on Appropriations
-
Court
held that these post-enactment measures which govern the areas of project
identification, fund release and fund realignment are not related to functions
of congressional oversight and, hence, allow legislators to intervene and/or
assume duties that properly belong to the sphere of budget execution
-
Court declares the 2013 PDAF
Article as well as all other provisions of law which similarly allow
legislators to wield any form of post-enactment authority in the implementation or
enforcement of the budget, unrelated to
congressional oversight, as violative of the separation of powers principle and thus
unconstitutional.
-
Legislators
cannot exercise powers which they do not have, whether through formal measures
written into the law or informal practices institutionalized in government
agencies, else the Executive department be deprived of what the Constitution
has vested as its own.
ii.
Non-delegability of
Legislative Power.
Definition:
Legislative power shall be exclusively exercised by the body to which the
Constitution has conferred the same., Section 1, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution states that such power shall be vested
in the Congress of the Philippines which shall consist of a Senate and a House
of Representatives, except to the extent reserved to the people by the
provision on initiative and referendum. It is clear that only Congress, acting
as a bicameral body, and the people, through the process of initiative and
referendum, may constitutionally wield legislative power and no other.
-
The
Court observed that the 2013 PDAF Article, insofar as it confers post-enactment
identification authority to individual legislators, violates the principle of
non-delegability.
-
Lega
Basis: Article
VI of the 1987 Constitution which
states that: "No money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in
pursuance of an appropriation made by law."
-
2013
PDAF Article, individual legislators are given a personal lump-sum fund from
which they are able to dictate (a) how much from such fund would go to (b) a
specific project or beneficiary that they themselves also determine. As these
two (2) acts comprise the exercise of the power of appropriation and given that the 2013 PDAF Article authorizes
individual legislators to perform the same, undoubtedly, said legislators
have been conferred the power to legislate which the Constitution does not,
however, allow.
-
Therefore, keeping with the principle of non-delegability of
legislative power, the Court declares the
2013 PDAF Article, as well as all other forms of Congressional Pork Barrel which contain the similar legislative
identification feature as herein discussed, as unconstitutional.
iii.
Checks and Balances;
Item-veto power
-
To
veto an item is a prime example of a constitutional check and balance.
-
The
former Organic Act and the present Constitution of the Philippines make the
Chief Executive an integral part of the law-making power. His disapproval of a
bill, commonly known as a veto, is essentially a legislative act. The questions
presented to the mind of the Chief Executive are precisely the same as those
the legislature must determine in passing a bill, except that his will be a
broader point of view. (Court in Bengzon Case)
|
ON VETO POWER |
|
|
PETITIONERS:
They claim that "in the current x x x system where the PDAF is a
lump-sum appropriation, the
legislator‘s identification of the projects after the passage of the GAA
denies the President the chance to veto that item later on." |
RESPONDENTS: They maintain that the
text of the Constitution envisions a
process which is intended to meet the demands of a modernizing economy and,
as such, lump-sum appropriations are essential to financially address
situations which are barely foreseen when a GAA is enacted. They argue that the
decision of the Congress to create some lump-sum appropriations is
constitutionally allowed and textually-grounded. |
-
CoA
Chairperson relays, "limited state auditors from obtaining relevant data
and information that would aid in more stringently auditing the utilization of
said Funds."
-
Court
finds the 2013
PDAF Article, as well as all Congressional Pork Barrel Laws of similar operation, to be unconstitutional. That such
budgeting system provides for a greater degree of flexibility to account for
future contingencies cannot be an excuse to defeat what the Constitution
requires.
-
Alowing
legislators to intervene in the various phases of project implementation – a
matter before another office of government – renders them susceptible to taking
undue advantage of their own office.
[RE: ACCOUNTABILITY OF THE LEGISLATORS.]
iv.
Political Dynasties
-
One
of the petitioners submits that the Pork Barrel System enables politicians
who are members of political dynasties to accumulate funds to perpetuate
themselves in power, in contravention of Section 26, Article II of the 1987 Constitution
which states that:
Sec.
26. The State shall guarantee equal access to opportunities for public service,
and prohibit political dynasties as may be defined by law. (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied)
v.
Local Autonomy
-
The
State‘s policy on local autonomy: (1987 Constitution)
Article II Sec.
25. The State shall ensure the autonomy of local governments.
Article
X Sec. 2. The territorial and political subdivisions shall enjoy local autonomy.
Article
X Sec. 3. The Congress shall enact a local government code which shall provide
for a more responsive and accountable local government structure instituted
through a system of decentralization with effective mechanisms of recall,
initiative, and referendum, allocate among the different local government units
their powers, responsibilities, and resources, and provide for the
qualifications, election, appointment and removal, term, salaries, powers and
functions and duties of local officials, and all other matters relating to the
organization and operation of the local units.
-
RA
7160,227 otherwise known as the "Local Government Code of 1991"
(LGC), wherein the policy on local autonomy had been more specifically
explicated as follows:
-
Sec.
2. Declaration of Policy. – (a) It is hereby declared the policy of the State
that the territorial and political subdivisions of the State shall enjoy
genuine and meaningful local autonomy to enable them to attain their fullest
development as self-reliant communities and make them more effective partners
in the attainment of national goals. Toward this end, the State shall provide
for a more responsive and accountable local government structure instituted
through a system of decentralization whereby local government units shall be
given more powers, authority, responsibilities, and resources. The process of
decentralization shall proceed from the National Government to the local
government units.
-
The
above-quoted provisions
of the Constitution and the LGC reveal the policy of the State to empower local
government units (LGUs) to develop and ultimately, become
self-sustaining and effective contributors to the national economy.
-
Court
agreed with the petitioners that the Congressional Pork Barrel goes against the constitutional
principles on local autonomy since it allows district
representatives, who are national officers, to substitute their judgments in
utilizing public funds for local development.
III. Substantive Issues on the Presidential Pork
Barrel.
1.
Validity of Appropriation
-
Petitioners
assail Section 8
of PD 910 and Section 12 of PD1869 (now, amended by PD 1993), which
respectively provide for the Malampaya Funds and the Presidential Social Fund,
as invalid appropriations laws since they do not have the "primary and
specific" purpose of authorizing the release of public funds from the
National Treasury.
-
Court
disagreed
and held that if a legal provision designates a determinate or determinable
amount of money and allocates the same for a particular public purpose, then
the legislative intent to appropriate becomes apparent and, hence, already
sufficient to satisfy the requirement of an "appropriation made by
law" under contemplation of the Constitution.
2.
Undue Delegation
-
Petitioners
contend that Section
8 of PD 910 constitutes an undue
delegation of legislative power since the phrase "and for such other
purposes as may be hereafter directed by the President" gives the
President "unbridled discretion to determine for what purpose the funds
will be used
-
Court
agreed with
petitioners that the phrase "and for such other purposes as may be
hereafter directed by the President" under Section 8 of PD 910 constitutes an
undue delegation of legislative power insofar as it does not lay
down a sufficient standard to adequately determine the limits of the
President‘s authority with respect to the purpose for which the
Malampaya Funds may be used.
DECISIONS
In view of
the constitutional violations discussed in this Decision, the Court hereby
declares as UNCONSTITUTIONAL:
(a) the
entire 2013 PDAF Article;
(b) all
legal provisions of past and present Congressional Pork Barrel Laws, such as
the previous PDAF and CDF Articles and the various Congressional Insertions,
which authorize/d legislators – whether individually or collectively organized
into committees – to intervene, assume or participate in any of the various
post-enactment stages of the budget execution, such as but not limited to the
areas of project identification, modification and revision of project
identification, fund release and/or fund realignment, unrelated to the power of
congressional oversight;
(c) all
legal provisions of past and present Congressional Pork Barrel Laws, such as
the previous PDAF and CDF Articles and the various Congressional Insertions,
which confer/red personal, lump-sum allocations to legislators from which they
are able to fund specific projects which they themselves determine;
(d) all
informal practices of similar import and effect, which the Court similarly
deems to be acts of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction; and
(e) the
phrases (1) "and for such other purposes as may be hereafter directed by
the President" under Section 8 of Presidential Decree No. 910 and (2)
"to finance the priority infrastructure development projects" under
Section 12 of Presidential Decree No. 1869, as amended by Presidential Decree No.
1993, for both failing the sufficient standard test in violation of the
principle of non-delegability of legislative power.
This Decision is immediately executory
but prospective in effect.
Comments
Post a Comment