GRECO ANTONIOUS BEDA B. BELGICA JOSE M. VILLEGAS JR. JOSE L. GONZALEZ REUBEN M. ABANTE and QUINTIN PAREDES SAN DIEGO, Petitioners,
vs.
HONORABLE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY PAQUITO N. OCHOA JR. SECRETARY OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT FLORENCIO B. ABAD, NATIONAL TREASURER ROSALIA V. DE LEON SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES represented by FRANKLIN M. DRILON m his capacity as SENATE PRESIDENT and HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES represented by FELICIANO S. BELMONTE, JR. in his capacity as SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE, Respondents.
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G.R. No. 208493
SOCIAL JUSTICE SOCIETY (SJS) PRESIDENT SAMSON S. ALCANTARA, Petitioner,
vs.
HONORABLE FRANKLIN M. DRILON in his capacity as SENATE PRESIDENT and HONORABLE FELICIANO S. BELMONTE, JR., in his capacity as SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, Respondents.
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G.R. No. 209251
PEDRITO M. NEPOMUCENO, Former Mayor-Boac, Marinduque Former Provincial BoardMember -Province of Marinduque, Petitioner,
vs.
PRESIDENT BENIGNO SIMEON C. AQUINO III and SECRETARY FLORENCIO BUTCH ABAD, DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT, Respondents.
TOPIC:
Article 7. Laws are repealed only by subsequent ones, and their violation or non-observance shall not be excused by disuse, or custom or practice to the contrary.
When the courts declared a law to be inconsistent with the Constitution, the former shall be void and the latter shall govern.
Administrative or executive acts, orders and regulations shall be valid only when they are not contrary to the laws or the Constitution.
RATIONALE:
OPERATIVE FACT DOCTRINE exhorts the recognition that until the judiciary, in an appropriate case, declares the invalidity of a certain legislative or executive act, such act is presumed constitutional and thus, entitled to obedience and respect and should be properly enforced and complied with.
Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. San Roque Power Corporation
- the doctrine merely "reflects awareness that precisely because the judiciary is the governmental organ which has the final say on whether or not a legislative or executive measure is valid, a period of time may have elapsed before it can exercise the power of judicial review that may lead to a declaration of nullity. It would be to deprive the law of its quality of fairness and justice then, if there be no recognition of what had transpired prior to such adjudication."
REFERENCES:
"Pork Barrel"
- refers to an appropriation of government spending meant for localized projects and secured
solely or primarily to bring money to a representative's district.
- Some scholars on the subject further use it to refer to legislative control of local appropriations.
- in the Philippines: it has been commonly referred to as lump-sum, discretionary funds of Members of the Legislature.
- the present cases and the recent controversies on the matter have, however, shown that the term‘s usage has expanded to include certain funds of the President such as the Malampaya Funds and the Presidential Social Fund.
temporary. By 1982, the Batasang Pambansa had already introduced a
new item in the General Appropriations Act (GAA) called the" Support for Local
Development Projects" (SLDP) under the article on "National Aid to Local Government
Units".
Countrywide Development Fund" (CDF)
Res judicata - a "matter adjudged"
Stare decisis non quieta et movere /
- follow past precedents and do not disturb what has been settle
are general procedural law principles which both deal with the effects of
previous but factually similar dispositions to subsequent cases. For the cases at bar, the
Court examines the applicability of these principles in relation to its prior rulings in
Philconsa and LAMP.
FACTS:
1. In the 2010-2016 ( Pnoy administration )
Representatives were given ₱70 Million each, broken down into ₱40 Million for "hard projects" and ₱30 Million for "soft projects"; while ₱200 Million was given to each Senator as well as the Vice-President, with a ₱100 Million allocation each for "hard" and "soft projects." Likewise, a provision on realignment of funds was included, but with the qualification that it may be allowed only once. The same provision also allowed the Secretaries of Education, Health, Social Welfare and Development, Interior and Local Government, Environment and Natural Resources,
Energy, and Public Works and Highways to realign PDAF Funds, with the further conditions that: (a) realignment is within the same implementing unit and same project category as the original project, for infrastructure projects; (b) allotment released has not yet been obligated for the original scope of work, and (c) the request for realignment is with the concurrence of the legislator concerned.
In the 201272 and 201373 PDAF Articles, it is stated that the "identification of projects
and/or designation of beneficiaries shall conform to the priority list, standard or design
prepared by each implementing agency (priority list requirement) x x x." However, as
practiced, it would still be the individual legislator who would choose and identify the
project from the said priority list.
In the 201272 and 201373 PDAF Articles, it is stated that the "identification of projects
and/or designation of beneficiaries shall conform to the priority list, standard or design
prepared by each implementing agency (priority list requirement) x x x." However, as
practiced, it would still be the individual legislator who would choose and identify the
project from the said priority list.74
Provisions on legislator allocations75 as well as fund realignment76 were included in the
2012 and 2013 PDAF Articles; but the allocation for the Vice-President, which was pegged
at ₱200 Million in the 2011 GAA, had been deleted. In addition, the 2013 PDAF Article now
allowed LGUs to be identified as implementing agencies if they have the technical
capability to implement the projects.77 Legislators were also allowed to identify
programs/projects, except for assistance to indigent patients and scholarships, outside of
his legislative district provided that he secures the written concurrence of the legislator of
the intended outside-district, endorsed by the Speaker of the House.78 Finally, any
realignment of PDAF funds, modification and revision of project identification, as well as
requests for release of funds, were all required to be favorably endorsed by the House
Malampaya Funds was created as a special fund under Section 880
of Presidential Decree No. (PD) 910,81 issued by then President Ferdinand E. Marcos
(Marcos) on March 22, 1976. In enacting the said law, Marcos recognized the need to set
up a special fund to help intensify, strengthen, and consolidate government efforts
relating to the exploration, exploitation, and development of indigenous energy resources
vital to economic growth.82 Due to the energy-related activities of the government in the
Malampaya natural gas field in Palawan, or the "Malampaya Deep Water Gas-to-Power
Project",83 the special fund created under PD 910 has been currently labeled as
Malampaya Funds.
On the other hand the Presidential Social Fund was created under Section 12, Title IV84 of
PD 1869,85 or the Charter of the Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation
(PAGCOR). PD 1869 was similarly issued by Marcos on July 11, 1983. More than two (2)
years after, he amended PD 1869 and accordingly issued PD 1993 on October 31, 1985,86
amending Section 1287 of the former law. As it stands, the Presidential Social Fund has
been described as a special funding facility managed and administered by the Presidential
Management Staff through which the President provides direct assistance to priority
programs and projects not funded under the regular budget. It is sourced from the share
of the government in the aggregate gross earnings of PAGCOR
ISSUEs:
I. Procedural Issues.
Whether or not "Pork Barrel System" is constitutional under the principles of res judicata and stare decisis.
II. Substantive Issues on the "Congressional Pork Barrel."
Whether or not the 2013 PDAF Article and all other Congressional Pork Barrel Laws similar thereto are unconstitutional considering that they violate the principles of/constitutional provisions on (a) separation of powers; (b) non-delegability of legislative power; (c) checks and balances; (d) accountability; (e) political dynasties; and (f) local autonomy.
III. Substantive Issues on the "Presidential Pork Barrel."
Whether or not the phrases (a) "and for such other purposes as may be hereafter directed
by the President" under Section 8 of PD 910,116 relating to the Malampaya Funds, and (b)
"to finance the priority infrastructure development projects and to finance the restoration
of damaged or destroyed facilities due to calamities, as may be directed and authorized by
the Office of the President of the Philippines" under Section 12 of PD 1869, as amended
by PD 1993, relating to the Presidential Social Fund, are unconstitutional insofar as they
constitute undue delegations of legislative power.
RULING:
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