Article 8

 Article 8

Judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution shall form a part of the legal system of the Philippines

 Caltex (Philippines) Inc vs. Palomar , Sept 29,1966, 18 SCRA247)

 

Secretary of Justice vs Catolico,Nov 18,1975, 68 SCRA62

http://lawyerly.ph/juris/view/c53fd 

FACTS:

Two administrative complaints and four charges of “serious misconduct and gross disregard of law” were formulated against Judge Alfredo Catolico.

The first complaint concerned that of the naturalization of 50 naturalized citizens which the the respondent declared the oath taking of the petitioners null and void.

(The first complaint arose out of the actuations in October of 1965 of respondent, then acting as Judge of the Court of First Instance of Misamis Occidental, relative to the naturalization cases of over fifty naturalized citizens wherein said respondent not only declared motu proprio, without any corresponding petition of the Republic of the Philippines, null and void the oath taking of therein petitioners, with the aggravating circumstance that, without priorly hearing the petitioner concerned, "the respondent delivered in open court a lengthy dissertation reflecting on the honesty and integrity of provincial and city fiscals appearing in naturalization cases, and venting his spleen particularly on Chua Tuan, referred to him as a Chinese who had become a multi-millionaire by making overshipments of copra, who was 'untouchable because he could buy his way out in Malacañang, in the Army, in the Foreign Affairs, in the Immigration, in the Bureau of Internal Revenue and in the Courts of Justice,' of which the respondent said he would take judicial notice.  The respondent further castigated Chua Tuan with the following epithets:  'balasubas;' ingrate; 'hambug;' animalistic; a danger and a disgrace to the community; a dishonor to the Filipino people." (Pars. 5 & 6, p. 2 of complaint.)

The second and third complaints which relate to respondent’s dismissal of the cases which have not been tried for more than thirty days and refusal to recognize not only the authority of the Court to authorize the continuation of the corresponding proceedings but also the personality of the Clerk of this Court to transmit to him the pertinent resolutions of the Court. 

The fourth complaint regarding the respondents alleged bias and prejudice either in his questioning of the witnesses or in acquitting the accused.

(The fourth complaint was filed by the widow of the victim, Mrs. Fermina Olaes, in a case of homicide in which the arraignment was held on October 3, 1973 and the hearings were set on October 15, November 23 and 27, December 6, 12, 17, 18, 20, 21 and 26, 1973 and January 2, 3 and 4, 1974 and the decision acquitting the accused was promulgated by respondent on January 10, 1974, two days before he reached the age of 70 years, the complainant charging that respondent hurried, in preference to other cases in his sala which deserved earlier attention, the trial with the intention of being able to finish and decide the same favorably to the accused before he (the judge) could retire, with the aggravating circumstance that:

"2.  Respondent during the hearing of December 26, 1973 was so carried away by his emotions that he was, for two hours, the one asking questions to the prosecution's witness; and that in the process, respondent 'bullied, ridiculed, frightened, threatened (there was even an instance when the judge was banging the table with his own fist) and humiliated the witness.

3.      Respondent has the propensity to ridicule the witness manifested in his questions regarding the illness of the witness when he asked the latter if he was examined by a veterinarian

4.      Respondent tried the case with a 'wrapped-up decision - that of acquittal' manifested in his order dated December 26, 1973)

Respondent claims that all his impugned actuations were motivated by his desire to comply with the rules and the law and, most of all, the best interests of justice which require the speedy and expeditious disposition of cases. Respondents plead that “if at all there was any error committed it is of the mind rather than the heart”

All the facts involved in the first three complaints relate to matters of record in the proceedings in this Court in which respondent had been duly heard, no further administrative proceedings were held after respondent filed his answer. 

The fourth case was referred to Justice Buenaventura de la Fuente of the Court of Appeals for appropriate investigation.  The report was submitted on August 1, 1975.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the respondent acted with “serious misconduct and gross disregard of law” in the four complaints charged against him.

RULING:

First to third - reprimanded lang siya

Fourth - weird lang talaga siya

For the obvious reason that all the facts involved in the first three complaints relate to matters of record in the proceedings in this Court in which respondent had been duly heard, no further administrative proceedings were held after respondent filed his answer.

In the first charge, the Court has, in a way, admonished the respondent, adding that they “should not lose the proper judicial perspective, and should see to it that in the execution of their sworn duties they do not overstep the limitations of their power as laid down by statute and by the rules of procedure”

With reference to the second and third charges of the Secretary, the Court had already reprimanded respondent for his offense for his refusal to “apply the law” as interpreted by the tribunal.

Anent the fourth charge, the report of the investigator is to the effect that the actuations of respondent complained of by Mrs. Olaes were not due to any improper or personal motive and were just the result of the innocuous eccentricities and odd ways and ideas of respondent which could not be categorized as serious misconduct nor deserving of any heavier sanction than admonition.

While the Court was awaiting said report, however, in a letter dated April 17, 1975, respondent informed the Court that His Excellency, President Ferdinand E. Marcos had accepted his resignation effective January 11, 1974, “without prejudice to his receiving whatever rights he may be entitled to under the retirement and other existing laws.” Premises considered, and in line with the established policy regarding similar situations wherein the President has accepted resignations without prejudice to the grant of legally possible retirement benefits thus rendering administrative cases pending against the official concerned, moot and academic, the Court resolved to DISMISS the cases against respondent.

Albert vs. Court of First Instance of Manila, May 29,1968, 23 SCRA 948

Facts:

Albert sued University Publishing Company, Inc. for breach of contract. Albert died before the case proceeded to trial, and Justo R. Albert, his estate’s administrator, was substituted. Finally, defendant’s liability was determined by this Court in L -15275. Plaintiff was to recover P15,000.00 with legal interest from judicial demand. When the Court of First Instance of Manila issued an order of execution against University

Publishing Company, Inc., plaintiff’s counsel and the Sheriff of the City of Manila went to see Jose M. Aruego, who signed the contract with plaintiff on behalf and as President of University Publishing Company, Inc. They then discovered that no such entity exists. A verification made at the Securities and Exchange Commission confirmed this fact. This triggered a verified petition in the court for the issuance of a writ of execution ordering the Sheriff of Manila to cause the satisfaction of the judgment against the assets and properties of Jose M. Aruego as the real defendant in the case. 

Instead of informing the lower court that it had in its possession copies of its certificate of registration, its articles of incorporation, its by-laws and all other papers material to its disputed corporate existence, University Publishing Company, Inc. chose to remain silent. 

the law firm of Jose M. Aruego merely countered plaintiff’s petition for execution that “said Jose M. Aruego is not a party to this case,” and, therefore, plaintiff's petition should be denied. Respondent court, presided over by His Honor, Judge Gaudencio Cloribel came up with an order that plaintiff’s motion filed is hereby denied

 

 

plaintiff appealed to this Court on this sole issue: “The lower court erred in denying the plaintiff- appellant’s petition praying that the judgment rendered against the alleged corporation, the above named defendant-appellee, be executed against the personal assets and properties of Jose M. Aruego, the real party to this case.” 

The order appealed from is hereby set aside and the case remanded ordering the lower court to hold supplementary proceedings for the purpose of carrying the judgment into effect against University Publishing Co., Inc. and/or Jose M. Aruego.” 

 University Publishing Company, Inc., in its motion for reconsideration thereof, asked that it be afforded opportunity to prove its corporate existence. Jose M. Aruego, the President and Counsel of University Publishing Company, Inc., for the first time appeared in propria persona before this Court as a “member of the Philippine Bar, private citizen.” 

He insisted that he was not a party to this litigation. The motion for reconsideration and for leaves to file original papers not in the record, is hereby denied.

Armed with the aforementioned decision and resolution of this Court in L-19118, petitioner returned to the lower court with a motion for execution and approval of the bill of costs and asking specifically for the issuance of the corresponding writ against Aruego to satisfy the judgment 

Aruego moved to intervene with an opposition in intervention to the motion for execution. Judge Gaudencio Cloribel, upon consideration of this motion for execution and for approval of the bill of costs, the opposition thereto by Aruego, and the reply to the opposition, granted the motion for execution and directed that a writ of execution “be issued accordingly”.

 

 Aruego came back with a motion for reconsideration, adamant in his resolve that he would not pay as he was not a party to the suit. This was opposed by the plaintiff. 

Judge Gaudencio CLoribel Reconsidered his order and denied the motion for a writ of execution against Jose m, Arugo – upon the ground that “said Jose M Aruego Has never been the party to the case and that the judgement sought to be executed is not against him.” 

Petitioners turn toi file a motion for reconsideration for the reason that the question of whether or not an order of execution could issue against Aruego had already been resolved by this court in its final judgement in L-19118 

Jose M. Aruego opposed the motion for reconsideration and prayed for supplementary proceedings to allow him as intervenor to present evidence in support thereof, alleging that the execution of the judgment against him was not sanctioned by law and procedure and that had intervenor been impleaded or given his day in court, he could have easily proven the legitimate and due existence of the University Publishing Company, Inc. as a bona fide corporation. He attached thereto the very same articles of incorporation, certificate of registration, by-laws and certificate of the Securities and Exchange Commission in the reconstitution of its records — documents which were rejected by this Court in its resolution of June 16, 1965 in L-19118.

the petitioner filed his reply to Aruego's opposition upon the ground that these are matters concluded in the decision and resolution of this Court, and that respondent court cannot admit said documents without going against this Court's clear mandate.

Resolution on plaintiff's motion for reconsideration was, by Judge Gaudencio Cloribel's order of May 20, 1966, held in abeyance until the termination of the supplementary proceedings, which the court thereupon granted, to allow Aruego to present evidence in support of his opposition to the motion for reconsideration

Aruego presented in evidence the documents heretofore mentioned, and in addition, the certificate dated February 17, 1965 signed by a majority of the directors of the University Publishing Company, Inc declaring that the corporation still exists and that the articles of incorporation have not been amended or modified

notwithstanding plaintiff's opposition to the admission of the documents just mentioned, and his

claim that the matter involved in the execution had long been finished and decided by this Court, Judge Gaudencio Cloribel denied plaintiff's motion for execution. 

Hence, this petition for a writ of certiorari and mandamus.

Issue

WON the lower court erred in denying the plaintiff- appellant’s petition praying that the judgment rendered against the alleged corporation, the above-named defendant-appellee, be executed against the personal assets and properties of Jose M. Aruego, the real party to this case.

RULING

YES. The lower court erred in denying the plaintiff-appellant’s petition praying that the judgment rendered against the alleged corporation, the above-named defendant-appellee, be executed against the personal assets and properties of Jose M. Aruego, the real party to this case. In the circumstances of this case, we are constrained to articulate a number of possibilities: that Judge Gaudencio Cloribel either:

(1) did not read our decision in L-19118, January 30, 1965, and our resolution in the same case promulgated on June 16, 1965; or

(2) having read, did not comprehend their import; or

(3) having read and understood, want only ignored them. It is the thinking of this Court,however, that Judge Gaudencio Cloribel simply shunted aside our decision and resolution.

He could not have overlooked the fact that it was his own order of September 9, 1961 denying execution—Because Aruego is not a party to this case— which was appealed to this Court. That very question of whether execution should issue against Aruego was squarely presented and as squarely resolved in the affirmative by this Court in L-19118. That Gaudencio Cloribel should have insisted in his opinion after his attention to (to be continue )

Tung Chin Hui v. Rodriguez,  340 SCRA 765 (G.R. No. 137571, 21 September 2000

RATIONALE:

Stare decisis, et non quieta movere

"When the court has once laid down a principle of law as applicable to a certain state of facts, it will adhere to that principle and apply it to all future cases where the facts are substantially the same."

FACTS:

1. Tung Chin Hui, Taiwanese citizen, obtained a visa at Philippine Embassy in Singapore, and arrived in the Philippines on 05 November 1998.

2. November 15, 1998: he was arrested and turned over to the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation (BID). 

3. November 25, 1998:  BID Board of Commissioners, after finding him guilty of possessing a tampered passport earlier canceled by Taiwanese authorities, ordered his summary deportation.

4. December 11, 1998:  he petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus before RTC Manila on the ground of illegal detention.

5. January 11, 1999: respondents filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which was denied by the trial court in an Order dated January 29, 1999

6. Respondents then filed a "[N]otice of [A]ppeal from the judgment of the Honorable Court in the above-stated case, dated January 29, 1999, a copy of which was received by the Bureau on February 11, 1999 and was received by the undersigned counsel on February 15, 1999. Dated February 15, 1999, it was received by the RTC on February 16, 1999 at 9:45 a.m.

7. Petitioner filed an "Opposition," claiming that the Notice had been filed beyond the 48-hour reglementary period for filing appeals in habeas corpus cases as prescribed by the pre-1997 Rules of Court. Although respondents alleged that they had received the said Order on February 15, 1999, petitioner contended that they had in fact received it on February 11, 1999, "as evidenced by the receipt of the service thereof and by the Sheriff’s Return

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Notice of Appeal was seasonably filed.

RULING:

YES. It was seasonably filed. Section 18, Rule 41 which provides for the 48-hour reglementary period within which to appeal habeas corpus had already been deemed repeal when it was not reproduced in the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. Accordingly, the reglementary period for filing an appeal in a habeas corpus case is now similar to that in ordinary civil actions13 and is governed by Section 3, Rule 41 of the 1997 Rules of Court, which provides:

"SEC. 3. Period of ordinary appeal. -- The appeal shall be taken within fifteen (15) days from notice of the judgment or final order appealed from. Where a record on appeal is required, the appellant shall file a notice of appeal and a record on appeal within thirty (30) days from notice of the judgment or final order.

Since the Notice of Appeal filed on February 16, 1999 or five (5) days after receipt of Order denying the Motion for Reconsideration on February 11, 1999, it is still within the 15-day reglementary period as per Sec. 3, Rule 41 of the 1997 Rules of Court.

The petitioner's contention that the principle of stare decisis be applied in consideration of past precedents that held filing within the 48-hr reglementary period is mandatory is bereft of merit. The 48-hr reglementary period was applied in those cases because they occurred prior to 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. Thus, 48-hr was yet to be excluded. In the present case, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure which omitted such provision is already in effect.

Thus, the notice of appeal was seasonably filed.

Sc decision: the Petition is DENIED and the assailed Order AFFIRMED. The Temporary Restraining Order issued by the Court is hereby immediately LIFTED. No pronouncement as to costs.

Tala Realty Services Corp. v. Banco Filipino,  334 SCRA 114 (G.R. No. 137980, 20 June 2000) –

R E S O L U T I O N

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

Before us is respondent's Motion for Reconsideration of our Decision dated June 20, 2000.

Respondent(BF) argues that the complaint for ejectment below was not based on non-payment of rentals but on the alleged expiration of respondent's lease contract with petitioner and the former's refusal to accept and comply with the new rental rates and conditions. 

 According to respondent, there was no allegation in the complaint of any failure on its part to pay any of the monthly rentals stipulated in the contract of lease and the same, not having been raised as an issue, should not have been passed upon by this Court.

The records, however, show that the issue of non-payment of rentals was, in fact, consistently raised from the Municipal Trial Court all the way to this Court. 

 Indeed, petitioner's Position Paper before the Municipal Trial Court dedicates an entire portion to respondent's "Violation of Terms and Conditions", inclusive of its unpaid rentals.  There, petitioner argued as follows -

"Assuming for the sake of argument that the original lease contract subsists, still the ground for ejectment of non-payment of rental holds.  It should be borne in mind that since April, 1994, defendant has not paid plaintiff a single cent.  If, according to defendant, the original lease contract subsists then, it should have continued to pay the amount of P20,500.00 per month stipulated thereon."[1] (underscored in the original)

This allegation of non-payment of rentals was in petitioner's petition for review filed with the Court of Appeals, as well as in the instant petition for review before us.

Next, respondent assails the application of its security deposit of P1,020,000.00 to rentals for the period of August, 1985 to November, 1989 as erroneous, since the same period only covers 52 months, while the amount of P1,020,000.00 would only account for 49.76 months.

 A cursory study of Annexes "K" and "L" of the Affidavit of Elizabeth Palma referred to in our Decision,readily reveals that the rentals due on the leased property for the period of August, 1985 to November, 1989 was P1,066,000.00.  Hence, the whole amount of P1,020,000.00 given by respondent as security deposit was sufficient to cover the rentals,

 still leaving a balance of P46,000.00. 

 This amount, together with outstanding rentals on other properties likewise leased by respondent from petitioner, was paid for by respondent's liquidator as part of its payment of P5,232,325.00.

Respondent also contends that the application of its security deposit was improper since it was not authorized under the provisions of the lease contract, and thus amounted to a unilateral amendment of the same. This is untenable.

 The stipulation in the lease contract that the security deposit shall be applied to the rentals due from the 11th to the 20th years of the lease presupposes that rental payments up to the 10th year are up to date. 

 But this was not the case here. In fact, respondent had an outstanding account of P1,066,000.00 representing unpaid rent for the period of August, 1985 to November, 1989, or from 5th to the 8th years of the lease term.  

Had the security deposit not been applied for that period, respondent would have been subject to immediate ejectment. 

Precisely, the security deposit was applied for the said period to cover for the unpaid rentals and to avoid immediate ejectment for non-payment of rentals.  

Respondent's insistence that the security deposit be applied to the 11th to 20th years of the lease as stipulated should thus fail.

In demanding that its security deposit be applied to the rentals for the 11th to the 20th years, respondent conveniently overlooks its unpaid obligations for the earlier period for which the said security deposit was actually applied. 

 Does it expect to have such unpaid rentals merely written off?  Evidently, that is exactly what respondent intended. 

Respondent also argues in its present Motion for Reconsideration that, inasmuch as it was closed and under receivership, it should not be answerable for its unpaid rentals over the leased premises during such time, passing the responsibility instead to the Central Bank.

 Respondent relies on the argument that its closure and consequent lack of access to its funds to pay off its obligations, including the rentals on the leased premises, was a fortuitous event which should excuse it from liability. 

 Granting, without conceding, that liability should not lie with respondent for unpaid rentals on the leased premises while it was under control of the Central Bank, this matter is not an issue in the instant case, where the subject matter is merely ejectment. 

 As the lessee of the premises, respondent had the exclusive obligation to settle any unpaid rentals.  

Petitioner dealt directly with respondent, and therefore had the right to enforce the lease contract against respondent only. 

 Any right of action that respondent may have against the Central Bank is a matter that can be best ventilated in the proper forum.

The fact that the application of respondent's security deposit was effected by and between petitioner and respondent's liquidator does not have any bearing on its validity, as the basic premise for its operation remains the same.

Finally, we reject respondent's argument that the principle of res judicata should equally apply to the issue of rent payment. As we have already clearly set out in the challenged Decision, "respondent's failure to pay any rentals beginning April 1994, which provided ground for its ejectment from the premises, justifies our departure from the outcome of G.R. No. 129887."[6]

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Motion for Reconsideration is DENIED WITH FINALITY for lack of merit.