Article 7.

Laws are repealed only by subsequent ones, and their violation or non-observance shall not be excused by disuse, or custom or practice to the contrary. When the courts declare a law to be inconsistent with the Constitution, the former shall be void and the latter shall govern.

Administrative or executive acts, orders and regulations shall be valid only when they are not contrary to the laws or the Constitution.

Quimsing vs Lachica , May 30,1961, 2 SCRA 183 (illegal operation of a cockpit)

Laws violated: Article 199 of the Revised Penal Code, in relation to sections 2285 and 2286 of the Revised Administrative Code.

Art. 199. Illegal cockfighting. — The penalty of arresto menor or a fine not exceeding 200 pesos, or both, in the discretion of the court, shall be imposed upon:

1. Any person who directly or indirectly participates in cockfights, by betting money or other valuable things, or who organizes cockfights at which bets are made, on a day other than those permitted by law.chanrobles virtual law library

2. Any person who directly or indirectly participates in cockfights, at a place other than a licensed cockpit.chanrobles virtual law library

Note: In Stat Con, we learn that one of the substantive requirements of a valid ordinance is it must not contravene with the Constitution or a statute as per article 7 of Civil Code.

SEC. 2285. Restriction upon cockfighting. — Cockfighting shall take place only in licensed cockpits and, except as provided n the next succeeding section hereof, only upon legal holidays and for a period of not exceeding three days during the celebration of the local fiesta. No card game or games of chance of any kind shall be permitted on the premises of the cockpit.

SEC. 2286. Cockfighting at fairs and carnivals. — In provinces where the provincial board resolves that a fair or exposition of agricultural and industrial products of the province, carnival, or any other act which may redound to the promotion of the general interests thereof, shall be held on a suitable date or dates, the council of the municipality in which such fair, exposition or carnival is held may, by resolution of a majority of the council, authorize the cockfighting permitted at a local fiesta to take place for not to exceed three days during said exposition fair, or carnival, if these fall on a date other than that of the local fiesta. Where this action is taken, cockfighting shall not be permitted during the local fiesta unless a legal holiday occurs at such period in which case cockfighting may be permitted upon the holiday.

FACTS:

The case is an appeal from a decision of the Court of First Instance of Iloilo dismissing the petition in this case, as well as the counterclaim of respondents herein, without costs.

Petitioner Joaquin Quimsing is the owner and manager of a duly licensed cockpit, located in the District of Molo, City of Iloilo. The cockpit was raided by members of the city police force and the Constabulary under the command of Capt. Alfredo Lachica and Lt. Narciso Aliño Jr. on February 13, 1958, ,

upon the ground that it was being illegally operated on that day, which was Thursday, not a legal holiday.

Quimsing claimed that the cockpit was authorized to operate on Thursday by an ordinance of the City Council of Iloilo, approved on October 31, 1956.

This notwithstanding, Capt. Lachica allegedly threatened to raid the cockpit should cockfighting be held therein, thereafter, on Thursdays. Moreover, Quimsing and nine (9) other persons were arrested and then charged in the Municipal Court of Iloilo with a violation of Article 199 of the Revised Penal Code, in relation to sections 2285 and 2286 of the Revised Administrative Code.

Quimsing filed a petition in the Court of First Instance of Iloilo, against Major Cesar Lucero, as the then provincial commander of the Constabulary, and Capt. Alfredo Lachica and Lt. Narciso Aliño, Jr., as incumbent PC officer in charge and acting chief of police, respectively, of the Iloilo City Police. In his petition, Quimsing set up two (2) causes of action:

1. for the recovery from respondents compensatory damages as well as moral and exemplary damages allegedly sustained in consequence of the raid and arrest effected on February 13, 1958, upon the ground that the same were made illegally and in bad faith

Petitioner’s reason: Cockfighting on Thursdays was authorized by Ordinances Nos. 5 and 58 of the City of Iloilo, in relation to Republic Act No. 938, and because Quimsing was at odds with the city mayor of Iloilo

2. writ of preliminary injunction, and, after trial, a permanent injunction, restraining respondents, in their official capacity, and/or their agents, from stopping the operation of said cockpit on Thursdays and making any arrest in connection therewith.

Respondent’s answer: the raid and arrest were made in good faith, without malice and in the faithful discharge of their official duties as law enforcing agents, and that, pursuant to the aforementioned provisions of the Revised Penal Code and the Revised Administrative Code, petitioner cannot legally hold cockfighting on Thursdays, despite said ordinances of the City of Iloilo. Respondents, likewise, set up a P150,000 counterclaim for moral and exemplary damages.

After due hearing, the Court of First Instance of Iloilo rendered judgment dismissing the petition, as well as respondents' counterclaim. Hence this appeal by petitioner herein, who maintains that:

1. The lower court erred in not disqualifying the city fiscal from representing the respondents-appellees in the first cause of action of the petition where they are sued in their personal capacity;

2. The lower court erred in not disqualifying the city fiscal from asking the invalidity of an ordinance of the City of Iloilo;

3. The lower court erred in declaring Ordinance No. 51 series of 1954 (, as amended by Ordinance No. 58, series of 1956, of the City of Iloilo as illegal;

4. The lower court erred in not awarding damages to the petitioner.

Issue: Whether or not ordinance No. 58 of the City of Iloilo in relation to Republic Act No. 938 is in violation of Article 199 of the revised penal code and therefore void?

Held: Yes

The question for determination is whether the power of the Municipal Board of Iloilo, under section 21 of its charter to "regulate . . . places of amusement", as broadened by Republic Act No. 938, as amended, to include "the power to regulate . . . by ordinance the establishment, maintenance, and operation of . . . cockpits," carries with it the authority to fix the dates on which "cockfighting" may be held.

However, Republic Act No. 938, as amended, does not give local governments a blanket authority to permit cockfighting at any time and for as long as said governments may wish it.

Repeals and even amendments by implication are not favored if it would entail a vital amendment of sections 2285 and 2286 of the Revised Administrative Code. Secondly, grants of power to local governments are to be construed strictly, and doubts in the interpretation thereof should be resolved in favor of the national government and against the political subdivisions concerned.

The theory of petitioner herein presupposes that the Republic of the Philippines has completely reversed its position and chosen, instead, to place the matter entirely at the discretion of local governments. We should not, and can not adopt, such premise except upon a clear and unequivocal expression of the will of Congress, which, insofar as said premise is concerned, is not manifest from the language used in Republic Act No. 938, as amended.

Ruling:

Capt. Lachica and Lt. Aliño Jr. had acted in good faith and under the firm conviction that they were faithfully discharging their duty as law enforcing agents. As regards Capt. Lachica and Lt. Aliño Jr., the records indicate that they were unaware of the city ordinances relieved upon by petitioner herein. Indeed, they appeared to have been surprised when petitioner invoked said ordinances. As His Honor the Trial judge said, that cockfighting on Thursdays is, despite the aforementioned ordinances, illegal under Article 199 of the Revised Penal Code, in relation to sections 2285 and 2286 of the Revised Administrative Code.

Article 199 of the Revised Penal Code provides:

The penalty of arresto menor or a fine not exceeding 200 pesos, or both, in the discretion of the court, shall be imposed upon:

2. Any person who directly or indirectly participates in cockfights, by betting money or other valuable things, or organizes such cockfights at a place other than a licensed cockpit.

Respondents maintain that this legal provision should construed be in relation to sections 2285 and 2286 of the Revised Administrative Code, reading:

Petitioner assails, however, the applicability of these two (2) provisions to the case at bar, upon the ground that said provisions form part of Chapter 57 of the Revised Administrative Code — which chapter is entitled "Municipal Law" — governing regular municipalities, not chartered cities, like the City of Iloilo, for, "except as otherwise specially provided", the term "municipality", as used in that Code and in said section 2286, "does not include chartered city, municipal district or other political division" (Section 2, Revised Administrative Code). Petitioner's contention is well-taken but it does not follow therefrom that he was entitled to hold cockfightings on Thursdays.

Pursuant to section 21 of Commonwealth Act No. 158, otherwise known as the Charter of the City of Iloilo:

Except as otherwise provided by law, the Municipal Board shall have the following legislative powers . . . to tax, fix the license fee for, and regulate, among others, theatrical performances . . . and places of amusements (par. j) . . . .

Moreover, under section 1 of Republic Act No. 938, as amended by Republic Act No. 1224:

The municipal or city board or council of each chartered city and the municipal council of each municipality and municipal district shall have the power to regulate or prohibit by ordinance the establishment, maintenance and operation of nightclubs, cabarets, dancing schools, pavilions, cockpits, bars, saloons, bowling alleys, billiard pools, and other similar places of amusements within its territorial jurisdiction: Provided, however, That no such places of amusement mentioned herein shall be established, maintained and/or operated within a radius of two hundred lineal meters in the case of night clubs, cabarets, pavilions, or other similar places, and fifty lineal meters in the case of dancing schools, bars, saloons, billiard pools, bowling alleys, or other similar places, except cockpits, the distance of which shall be left to the discretion of the municipal or city board or council, from any public building, schools, hospitals and churches: Provided, further, That no municipal or city ordinance fixing distances at which such places of amusement may be established or operated shall apply to those already licensed and operating at the time of the enactment of such municipal or city ordinance, nor will the subsequent opening of any public building or other premises from which distances shall be measured prejudice any place of amusement already then licensed and operating, but any such place of amusement established within fifty lineal meters from any school, hospital or church shall be so constructed that the noise coming therefrom shall not disturb those in the school, hospital or church, and, if such noise causes such disturbance then such place of amusement shall not operate during school hours when near a school, or at night when near a hospital, or when there are religious services when near a church: Provided, furthermore, That no minor shall be admitted in any bar, saloon, cabaret, or night club employing hostesses: And provided, finally, That this Act shall not apply to establishments operating by virtue of Commonwealth Act Numbered Four hundred eighty-five nor to any establishment already in operation when Republic Act Numbered Nine hundred seventy-nine took effect.

However, Republic Act No. 938, as amended, does not give local governments a blanket authority to permit cockfighting at any time and for as long as said governments may wish it.

Lastly, "cockpits" and "cockfighting" are regulated separately by our laws. Thus, section 2243 (i) of the Revised Administrative Code empowers municipal councils "to regulate cockpits". Yet, the authority of said council over "cockfighting" is found in sections 2285 and 2286 of said Code, not in said section 2243 (i). Similarly, Article 199 of the Revised Penal Code punishes, not illegal "cockpits", but "illegal cockfighting". What is more, participation in cockfights "on a day other than those permitted by law", in dealt with in said article separately from participation in cockfights "at a place other than a licensed cockpit." .

So, too, the authority of local governments, under Republic Act No. 938, as amended, to "regulate . . . the establishment, maintenance and operation of . . . cockpits", does not necessarily connote the power to regulate "cockfighting", except insofar as the same must take place in a duly licensed "cockpit".

In short, we are of the opinion that the city ordinances relied upon by petitioner herein, authorizing cockfighting on Thursdays, are invalid.

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby affirmed, without special pronouncement as to costs. It is so ordered.

Floresca vs Philex Mining Corp, April 30,1985, 136 SCRA 141 (Lindsay)

TOPIC:

Article 7. Laws are repealed only by subsequent ones, and their violation or non-observance shall not be excused by disuse, or custom or practice to the contrary.

When the courts declared a law to be inconsistent with the Constitution, the former shall be void and the latter shall govern.

Administrative or executive acts, orders and regulations shall be valid only when they are not contrary to the laws or the Constitution.

LAWS COVERED:

Workmen’s Compensation Act (1928)

Provides for compensation benefits for loss of income due to work connected or work aggravated death, sickness or injury

Workmen's Compensation Act - amended on 20 June 1952

Exclusive jurisdiction of the Workmen’s Compensation Commission (now Employees Compensation Commission)

Civil Code (1950)

Awards damages to one as a vindication of the wrongful invasion of his rights;

Damages (actual, moral and/or exemplary) — the indemnity recoverable by a person who has sustained injury either in his person, property or relative rights, through the act or default of another.

The 1973 Constitution likewise commands the State to "promote social justice to insure the dignity, welfare, and security of all the people "... regulate the use ... and disposition of private property and equitably diffuse property ownership and profits "establish, maintain and ensure adequate social services in, the field of education, health, housing, employment, welfare and social security to guarantee the enjoyment by the people of a decent standard of living" (Sections 6 and 7, Art. II, 1973 Constitution); "... afford protection to labor, ... and regulate the relations between workers and employers ..., and assure the rights of workers to ... just and humane conditions of work" (Sec. 9, Art. II, 1973 Constitution, emphasis supplied).

social justice then secured by Section 5 of Article 11 and Section 6 of Article XIV of the 1935 Constitution, and now by Sections 6, 7, and 9 of Article 11 of the DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES AND STATE POLICIES of the 1973 Constitution, as amended, and as implemented by Articles 2176, 2177, 2178, 1173, 2201, 2216, 2231 and 2232 of the New Civil Code of 1950.

Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre- existing contractual relation between the parties, is calleda quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter.

Art. 2178. The provisions of articles 1172 to 1174 are also applicable to a quasi-delict.

(b) Art. 1173—The fault or negligence of the obligor consists in the omission of that diligence which is required by the

nature of the obligation and corresponds with the circumstances of the persons, of the time and of the place. When

negligence shows bad faith, the provisions of Articles 1171 and 2201, paragraph 2 shall apply.

Art. 2201. x x x x x x x x x

In case of fraud, bad faith, malice or wanton attitude, the obligor shall be responsible for all damages which may be reasonably attributed to the non-performance of the obligation.

Art. 2231. In quasi-delicts, exemplary damages may be granted if the defendant acted with gross negligence.

Labor Code

Art. 173. Exclusiveness of liability.- Unless otherwise provided, the liability of the State Insurance Fund under this Title shall be exclusive and in place of all other liabilities of the employer to the employee, his dependents or anyone otherwise entitled to receive damages on behalf of the employee or his dependents. The payment of compensation under this Title shall bar the recovery of benefits as provided for in Section 699 of the Revised Administrative Code, Republic Act Numbered Eleven hundred sixty-one, as amended, Commonwealth Act Numbered One hundred eighty- six, as amended, Commonwealth Act Numbered Six hundred ten, as amended, Republic Act Numbered Forty-eight hundred Sixty-four, as amended, and other laws whose benefits are administered by the System during the period of such payment for the same disability or death, and conversely (emphasis supplied).

Amended Section 5 of the Workmen's Compensation Act No. 3428,

Sec. 5. Exclusive right to compensation.- The rights and remedies granted by this Act to an employee by reason of a personal injury entitling him to compensation shall exclude all other rights and remedies accruing to the employee, his personal representatives, dependents or nearest of kin against the employer under the Civil Code and other laws, because of said injury.

FACTS:

Date filed before SC: 16 December 1968

1. Sometime prior to 28 June 1967, it is alleged that Philex operated with gross and reckless negligence and imprudence and deliberate failure to address safety concerns in the mining site. Much water accumulated in an open pit area which caused pressure in the working shafts below. As a result, said area collapsed. Out of 48, 5 escaped, 22 rescued within the week. But 21 were left to die due to Philex’s order to stop rescue mission.

2. Heirs of the 21 filed a civil complaint in CFI. Philex filed a motion to dismiss arguing that the accident falls under the Workers’ Compensation Act (WCA) and thus outside of CFI jurisdiction. Workmen's compensation refers to liability for compensation for loss resulting from injury, disability or death of the working man through industrial accident or disease, without regard to the fault or negligence of the employer, while the claim for damages under the Civil Code which petitioners pursued in the regular court, refers to the employer's liability for reckless and wanton negligence resulting in the death of the employees and for which the regular court has jurisdiction to adjudicate the same. Suing in regular courts under the Civil Code entails higher damages (actual, moral and/or exemplary). But since the heirs have already received compensation by virtue of WCA, they are no longer entitled to a damage suit.

3. Petitioners' defense is that the claims were filed under the Workmen's Compensation Act before they learned of the official report of the committee created to investigate the accident which established the criminal negligence and violation of law by Philex, and which report was forwarded by the Director of Mines to the then Executive Secretary Rafael Salas in a letter dated October 19, 1967 only.

4. It was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. The heirs of the deceased filed the present petition.

ISSUE:

1. Whether the injured/deceased employees' heirs have a right of selection or choice of action between availing of the worker's right under the Workmen's Compensation Act and suing in the regular courts under the Civil Code for higher damages (actual, moral and/or exemplary) from the employer by virtue of negligence (or fault) of the employer or of his other employees or whether they may avail cumulatively of both actions, i.e., collect the limited compensation under the Workmen's Compensation Act and sue in addition for damages in the regular courts.

2. Whether Article 173 of the New Labor Code impliedly repeal the articles of the New Civil Code and Sec. 5 of the Workmens Compensation Act.

RULING:

1. YES. It was ruled in Pacana Vs. Cebu Autobus Company that an injured worker has a choice of either to recover from the employer the fixed amounts set by the Workmen's Compensation Act or to prosecute an ordinary civil action against the tortfeasor for higher damages but he cannot pursue both courses of action simultaneously.

In this case, although the other petitioners had received the benefits under the Workmen's Compensation Act, such may not preclude them from bringing an action before the regular court because they became cognizant of the fact that Philex has been remiss in its contractual obligations with the deceased miners only after receiving compensation under the Act. Had petitioners been aware of said violation of government rules and regulations by Philex, and of its negligence, they would not have sought redress under the Workmen's Compensation Commission which awarded a lesser amount for compensation. The choice of the first remedy was based on ignorance or a mistake of fact, which nullifies the choice as it was not an intelligent choice.

2. No. Art. 173 expressly repealed only Section 699 of the Revised Administrative Code, R.A. No. 1161, as amended, C.A. No. 186, as amended, R.A. No. 610, as amended, R.A. No. 4864, as amended, and all other laws whose benefits are administered by the System (referring to the GSIS or SSS). Not benefits for Workmens Compensation Act. Thus, recovery under the New Civil Code for damages arising from negligence, is not barred by Article 173 of the New Labor Code. And the damages recoverable under the New Civil Code are not administered by the System provided for by the New Labor Code.

Also, the aforementioned articles of the New Civil Code implemented constitutional provisions that "promote social justice to insure the dignity, welfare, and security of all the people "... regulate the use ... and disposition of private property and equitably diffuse property ownership and profits "establish, maintain and ensure adequate social services in, the field of education, health, housing, employment, welfare and social security to guarantee the enjoyment by the people of a decent standard of living" (Sections 6 and 7, Art. II, 1973 Constitution); "... afford protection to labor, ... and regulate the relations between workers and employers ..., and assure the rights of workers to ... just and humane conditions of work" (Sec. 9, Art. II, 1973 Constitution).

The guarantees of social justice embodied in the said constitutional provisions are statements of legal principles to be applied and enforced by the courts.

In case of any doubt which may be engendered by Article 173 of the New Labor Code, both the New Labor Code and the Civil Code direct that the doubts should be resolved in favor of the workers and employees.

REFERENCES:

(before amendment)

(As amended on 20 June 1952)

The aforequoted provisions of Section 5 of the Workmen's Compensation Act, before and after it was amended by Commonwealth Act No. 772 on June 20, 1952, limited the right of recovery in favor of the deceased, ailing or injured employee to the compensation provided for therein. Said Section 5 was not accorded controlling application by the Supreme Court in the 1970 case of Pacana vs. Cebu Autobus Company (32 SCRA 442) when it was ruled that an injured worker has a choice of either to recover from the employer the fixed amount set by the Workmen's Compensation Act or to prosecute an ordinary civil action against the tortfeasor for greater damages; but he cannot pursue both courses of action simultaneously. Said Pacana case penned by Mr. Justice Teehankee, applied Article 1711 of the Civil Code.

Since the first sentence of Article 173 of the New Labor Code is merely a re-statement of the first paragraph of Section 5 of the Workmen's Compensation Act, as amended, and does not even refer, neither expressly nor impliedly, to the Civil Code as Section 5 of the Workmen's Compensation Act did, with greater reason said Article 173 must be subject to the same interpretation adopted in the cases of Pacana, Valencia and Esguerra aforementioned as the doctrine in the aforesaid three (3) cases is faithful to and advances the social justice guarantees enshrined in both the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions.

It should be stressed that the liability of the employer under Section 5 of the Workmen's Compensation Act or Article 173 of the New Labor Code is limited to death, ailment or injury caused by the nature of the work, without any fault on the part of the employers. It is correctly termed no fault liability. Section 5 of the Workmen's Compensation Act, as amended, or Article 173 of the New Labor Code, does not cover the tortious liability of the employer occasioned by his fault or culpable negligence in failing to provide the safety devices required by the law for the protection of the life, limb and health of the workers. Under either Section 5 or Article 173, the employer remains liable to pay compensation benefits to the employee whose death, ailment or injury is work-connected, even if the employer has faithfully and diligently furnished all the safety measures and contrivances decreed by the law to protect the employee.

Article 10 of the New Civil Code states: "In case of doubt in the interpretation or application of laws, it is presumed that

the law-making body intended right and justice to prevail. "

More specifically, Article 1702 of the New Civil Code likewise directs that. "In case of doubt, all labor legislation and all

labor contracts shall be construed in favor of the safety and decent living of the laborer."

SC Ruling: Case is remanded to the lower court for further proceedings. Should the petitioners be successful in their bid before the lower court, the payments made under the Workmen's Compensation Act should be deducted from the damages that may be decreed in their favor.

Noblejas vs Teehankee, April 29,1968, 23 SCRA 405 (Russel)

NOBLEJAS v TEEHANKEE23 SCRA 405April 29, 1968 crime: approving or recommending approval of subdivision,consolidation and consolidated-subdivision plans covering areas greatly in excess of the areas covered by the original titles.

Principle :Petition for writ of prohibition with preliminary injunction

FACTS:

Petition for a writ of prohibition with preliminary injunction to restrain the Secretary of Justice from investigating the official actuations of the Commissioner of Land Registration, and to declare inoperative his suspension by the Executive Secretary pending investigation.

Antonio H. Noblejas is the duly appointed, confirmed and qualified Commissioner of Land Registration.

By the terms of section 2 of RA 1151, the said Commissioner is declared "entitled to the same compensation, emoluments and privileges as those of a Judge of the Court of First Instance."P19,000.00."

- On March 7, 1968, Sec of Justice Teehankee coursed to Noblejas a letter requiring him to explain in writing why no disciplinary action should be taken against petitioner for "approving or recommending approval of subdivision,consolidation and consolidated-subdivision plans covering areas greatly in excess of the areas covered by the original titles.

Noblejas answered and apprised the Secretary of Justice that, as he enjoyed the rank, privileges, emoluments and compensation of a Judge of the Court of First Instance, he could only be suspended and investigated in the same manner as a Judge of the Courts of First Instance, and, therefore, the papers relative to his case should be submitted to the Supreme Court, for action thereon conformably to section 67 of the Judiciary Act(R. A. No. 296) and Revised Rule 140 of the Rules of Court.- On March 17, 1968,

Noblejas received a communication signed by the Executive Secretary, "by authority of the President",

whereby, based on "finding that a prima facie case exists against you for gross negligence and conduct prejudicial to the public interest", petitioner was "hereby suspended, upon receipt hereof, pending investigation of the above charges."-

On March 18, 1968, petitioner applied to this Court, reiterating the contentions advanced in his letter to the Secretary of Justice, claiming lack of jurisdiction and abuse of discretion, and praying for restraining writs.

In their answer respondents admit the facts but denied that petitioner, as Land Registration Commissioner , exercises judicial functions, or that the petitioner may be considered a Judge of First Instance within the purview of the Judiciary Act and Revised Rules of Court 140;

that the function of investigating charges against public officers is administrative or executive in nature; that the Legislature may not charge the judiciary with non-judicial functions or duties except when reasonably incidental to the fulfillment of judicial duties, as it would be in violation of the principle of the separation of powers.

ISSUE: whether or not the Commissioner of Land Registration may only be investigated by the Supreme Court, in view of the conferment upon him by RA 1151 and Appropriation Laws of the rank and privileges of a Judge of the Court of First Instance.

HELD:

section 67 of the Judiciary Act... recites that "No District Judge shall be separated or removed from office by the President of the Philippines unless sufficient cause shall exist in the judgment of the Supreme Court .

petitioner's theory that the grant of "privileges of a Judge of First Instance" includes by implication the right to be investigated only by the Supreme Court and to be suspended or removed upon its recommendation, would necessarily result in the same... right being possessed by a variety of executive officials upon whom the Legislature had indiscriminately conferred the same privileges

To adopt petitioner's theory, therefore, would mean... placing upon the Supreme Court the duty of investigating and disciplining all these officials whose functions are plainly executive, and the consequent curtailment by mere implication from the Legislative grant, of the President's power to discipline and remove...

administrative officials who are presidential appointees, and which the Constitution expressly place under the President's supervision and control (Constitution, Art. VII), sec l0[l]):...

if the Legislature had really intended to include in the general grant of "privileges" or "rank and privileges of Judges of the Court of First Instance" the right to be investigated by the Supreme Court, and to be suspended or removed only upon recommendation of that Court, then such grant of privileges would be unconstitutional, since it would violate the fundamental doctrine of separation of powers, by charging this court with the administrative function of supervisory... control over executive officials, and simultaneously reducing pro tanto the control of the Chief Executive over such officials.

the resolution of a consulta by a Register of Deeds is a judicial function, as contrasted with administrative process. It will be noted that by specific provision of the section, the decision of the Land Registration

Commissioner "shall be conclusive and binding upon all Registers of Deeds" alone, and not upon other parties. This limitation[1] in effect identifies the resolutions of the Land Registration Commissioner with those of any other bureau director, whose... resolutions or orders bind his subordinates alone. That the Commissioner's resolutions are appealable does not prove that they are not administrative

RULE:

Conformably to the well-known principle of statutory construction that statutes should be given, whenever possible, a meaning that will not bring them in conflict with the Constitution,

We are constrained to rule that the grant by Republic Act 1151 to the Commissioner of Land Registration of the "same privileges as those of a Judge of the Court of First Instance" did not include, and was not intended to include, the right to demand investigation by the Supreme Court, and to be suspended or removed only upon that Court’s recommendation; for otherwise, the said grant of privileges would be violative of the Constitution and be null and void. Consequently, the investigation and suspension of the aforenamed Commissioner pursuant to sections 32 and 34 of the Civil Service Law (R.A. 2260) are neither abuses of discretion nor acts in excess of jurisdiction.

WHEREFORE, the writs of prohibition and injunction applied for are denied, and the petition is ordered dismissed. No costs

Lidasan vs Commission on Elections, Oct 25,1967, 21 SCRA 497

https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1967/oct1967/gr_l-28089_1967.html

Law in dispute: Republic Act 4790 reads:

Sec. 1. Barrios Togaig, Madalum, Bayanga, Langkong, Sarakan, Kat-bo, Digakapan, Magabo, Tabangao, Tiongko, Colodan, Kabamakawan, Kapatagan, Bongabong, Aipang, Dagowan, Bakikis, Bungabung, Losain, Matimos and Magolatung, in the Municipalities of Butig and Balabagan, Province of Lanao del Sur, are separated from said municipalities and constituted into a distinct and independent municipality of the same province to be known as the Municipality of Dianaton, Province of Lanao del Sur. The seat of government of the municipality shall be in Togaig.

Sec. 2. The first mayor, vice-mayor and councilors of the new municipality shall be elected in the nineteen hundred sixty-seven general elections for local officials.

Sec. 3. This Act shall take effect upon its approval.

Constitutional mandate: "No bill which may be enacted into law shall embrace more than one subject which shall be expressed in the title of the bill"

FACTS:

Act created the municipality of Dianaton. However, barrios Togaig and Madalum mentioned in the act are also found within the municipality of Buldon, Province of Cotabato

While Bayanga, Langkong, Sarakan, Kat-bo, Digakapan, Magabo, Tabangao, Tiongko, Colodan and Kabamakawan are parts and parcel of another municipality, the municipality of Parang, also in the Province of Cotabato and not of Lanao del Sur

____________________________________________________________________________

In 1966, the Chief Executive enacted RA4790, now in dispute, creating the municipality of Dianaton, Lanao del Sur.

It came to light later that barrios Togaig and Madalum just mentioned are within the municipality of Buldon, Province of Cotabato, and that Bayanga, Langkong, Sarakan, Kat-bo, Digakapan, Magabo, Tabangao, Tiongko, Colodan and Kabamakawan are parts and parcel of another municipality, the municipality of Parang, also in the Province of Cotabato and not of Lanao del Sur.

Prompted by the coming elections, Comelec adopted its resolution of August 15, 1967, the pertinent portions of which are:

For purposes of establishment of precincts, registration of voters and for other election purposes, the Commission RESOLVED that pursuant to RA 4790, the new municipality of Dianaton, Lanao del Sur shall comprise the barrios of Kapatagan, Bongabong, Aipang, Dagowan, Bakikis, Bungabung, Losain, Matimos, and Magolatung situated in the municipality of Balabagan, Lanao del Sur, the barrios of Togaig and Madalum situated in the municipality of Buldon, Cotabato, the barrios of Bayanga, Langkong, Sarakan, Kat-bo, Digakapan, Magabo, Tabangao, Tiongko, Colodan and Kabamakawan situated in the municipality of Parang, also of Cotabato.

Doubtless, as the statute stands, twelve barrios — in two municipalities in the province of Cotabato — are transferred to the province of Lanao del Sur. This brought about a change in the boundaries of the two provinces.

Apprised of this development, on September 7, 1967, the Office of the President, through the Assistant Executive Secretary, recommended to Comelec that the operation of the statute be suspended until "clarified by correcting legislation."

Comelec, by resolution of September 20, 1967, stood by its own interpretation, declared that the statute "should be implemented unless declared unconstitutional by the Supreme Court."

This triggered the present original action for certiorari and prohibition by Bara Lidasan, a resident and taxpayer of the detached portion of Parang, Cotabato, and a qualified voter for the 1967 elections. He prays that Republic Act 4790 be declared unconstitutional; and that Comelec's resolutions of August 15, 1967 and September 20, 1967 implementing the same for electoral purposes, be nullified.

1. Petitioner relies upon the constitutional requirement aforestated, that "[n]o bill which may be enacted into law shall embrace more than one subject which shall be expressed in the title of the bill."

2. It may be well to state, right at the outset, that the constitutional provision contains dual limitations upon legislative power. First. Congress is to refrain from conglomeration, under one statute, of heterogeneous subjects. Second. The title of the bill is to be couched in a language sufficient to notify the legislators and the public and those concerned of the import of the single subject thereof.

Of relevance here is the second directive. The subject of the statute must be "expressed in the title" of the bill. This constitutional requirement "breathes the spirit of command."3 Compliance is imperative, given the fact that the Constitution does not exact of Congress the obligation to read during its deliberations the entire text of the bill. In fact, in the case of House Bill 1247, which became Republic Act 4790, only its title was read from its introduction to its final approval in the House of Representatives4 where the bill, being of local application, originated.5

.Some barrios mentioned where within other municipalities in other provinces. COMELEC then adopted a resolution which included said barrios under the new municipality, changing the boundaries of the provinces. The office of thePresident said recommended COMELEC that the operation of the statute be suspended until clarified, butCOMELEC stood by its own interpretation, saying that the statute should be implemented until clarified bycorrecting legislation. Petitioner then filed an original action for certiorari and prohibition as a resident and taxpayer of the detached portion of Parang, Cotabato, and a qualified voter for the 1967 elections, praying that the RA be invalidated since it embraced more than one subject as against its bill’s title

Issue: Whether or not RA 4790 is invalid.

Held: Yes it is invalid.

Congress must refrain from conglomeration of heterogenous subjects, so the title of the bill must be couched in a language sufficient to notify legislators and the public and those concerned of the import (nature, scope, consequences, operation) of the single subject thereof. It is a constitutional requirement breathing the spirit of the command, especially when on the first reading, Congress is not obligated to read the entire bill. The test is whether or not the title is misleading, or whether or not the title is so uncertain that the average person would not be informed of the purpose of its enactment. The title "An Act Creating the Municipality of Dianaton, in the Province of Lanao del Sur"8 — projects that only said province is affected by the creation, not the thought that communities of the adjacent province are incorporated in the new town. The RA creates the municipality from 21 barrios from other towns, and dismembers two municipalities in another province. Transfer of a sizeable portion of territory from one province to another of necessity involves reduction of area, population and income of the first and the corresponding increase of those of the other. This is as important as the creation of a municipality. And yet, the title did not reflect this fact. Salvaging the bill is impossible (enough must remain to make an intelligible and valid statute, carrying our the legislative intent), for knowing that Dianaton was created upon considerations of progressive community, large aggregate population, and sufficient income, it may be said that Congress intended the creation with all included barrios and not only those salvageable.

Teoxon vs. Members of the Board of Administrators, June 30,1970, 33SCRA585 (Jirohm)

DOMINGO B. TEOXON vs. MEMBERS OF THE BOARD OF ADMINISTRATORS, PHILIPPINE VETERANS ADMINISTRATION

DOCTRINE:

Regulations adopted under legislative authority by a particular department must be in harmony with the provisions of the law, and for the sole purpose of carrying into effect its general provisions. By such regulations, of course, the law itself cannot be extended. So long, however, as the regulations relate solely to carrying into effect the provisions of the law, they are valid

FACTS:

The petitioner sustained physical injuries in line of duty as a former member of a recognized guerilla organization which participated actively in the resistance movement against the enemy, and as a result of which petitioner suffered a permanent, physical disability.

For having been permanently incapacitated from work, he filed his claim for disability pension with the Philippine Veterans Administration under the Veterans' Bill of Rights, Republic Act No. 65.

However, respondents in turn would limit the amount of pension received by him in accordance with the rules and regulations promulgated by them.

Petitioner filed his suit for mandamus before the CFI of Manila alleging that he filed his claim for disability pension under the Veterans' Bill of Rights, Republic Act No. 65, for having been permanently incapacitated from work and that he was first awarded

First pension P25.00 monthly, then increased to P50.00/ month contrary to the terms of the basic law as thereafter amended

His claim, therefore, was for a pension effective:

· May 10, 1955 at the rate of P50.00 a month up to June 21, 1957

· June 22, 1957 – June 30, 1963, P100 + P10 (for unmarried minor children below 18)

· July 1, 1963 – a difference of P50 + P10 a month

He would likewise seek for the payment of moral and exemplary

Respondent, while admitting, with qualification, the facts as alleged in the petition, would rely primarily in its special and affirmative defenses, on petitioner not having exhausted its administrative remedies and his suit being in effect one against the government, which cannot prosper without its consent.

CFI dismissed the petition of Teoxon stating that the respondent Board has authority under the Pension law to process applications for pension, using as guide the rules and regulations that it adopted under the law and their decisions, unless shown clearly to be in error or against the law or against the general policy of the Board.

Issue:

W/N the petitioners right as conferred by law takes precedence to what the

administrative rules and regulations of respondents provide is indisputable

HELD:

YES, SC held that the recognition of the power of administrative officials to promulgate rules in the implementation of the statute, necessarily limited to what is provided for in the legislative enactment. Regulations adopted under legislative authority by a particular department must be in harmony with the provisions of the law, and for the sole purpose of carrying into effect its general provisions. By such regulations, of course, the law itself cannot be extended. So long, however, as the regulations relate solely to carrying into effect the provisions of the law, they are valid

WHEREFORE, the decision of December 4, 1965 of the lower court is reversed, and another one entered granting his petition for mandamus. Respondents are ordered to pay petitioner a pension effective

· May 10, 1955 at the rate of P50.00 a month up to June 21, 1957

· June 22, 1957 – June 30, 1963, P100 + P10 (for unmarried minor children below 18)

July 1, 1963 – a difference of P50 + P10 a month

Belgica vs Ochoa, GR # 208566 Nov 19,

Millarosa vs Carmel Devt Inc Nov 27,2013 (TANGINA HABA NG GAGONG TO) SORRY BAKA MATAGALAN TINAPOS KO CHAP 6

MORETO MIRALLOSA and all persons claiming rights and interests under him, Petitioner,

vs.

CARMEL DEVELOPMENT INC., Respondent.

SERENO, CJ:

This is an appeal by way of a Petition for Review on Certiorari1 dated 6 December 2010 assailing the Decision2 and Resolution3 of the Court of Appeals CA) in C.A.-G.R. SP No. 105190, which reversed the Decision4 and Order5 of the Regional Trial Court RTC), Branch 121, Caloocan City in Civil Case No. C-22018. The RTC had reversed the Decision6 of the Metropolitan Trial Court MeTC), Branch 52, Caloocan City in Civil Case No. 03-27114, ordering petitioner to vacate the subject property in this case for ejectment.

The antecedent facts are as follows:

FACTS

Respondent Carmel Development, Inc. was the registered owner of a Caloocan property known as the Pangarap Village located at Barrio Makatipo, Caloocan City.

The property has a total land area of 156 hectares and consists of three parcels of land registered in the name of Carmel Farms, Inc. under Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) Nos. (62603) 15634, (62605) 15632 and (64007) 15807.8 The lot that petitioner presently occupies is Lot No. 32, Block No. 73 covered by the titles above-mentioned.

On 14 September 1973, President Ferdinand Marcos issued Presidential Decree No. 293 (P.D. 293),10 which invalidated the titles of respondent and declared them open for disposition to the members of the Malacañang Homeowners Association, Inc. (MHAI), to wit:

NOW, THEREFORE, I, FERDINAND E. MARCOS, President of the Philippines, do hereby order and decree that any and all sales contracts between the Government and the original purchasers, are hereby cancelled, and those between the latter and the subsequent transferees, and any and all transfers thereafter, all of Tala Estate, Caloocan City are hereby declared invalid and null and void ab initio as against the Government; that Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. 62603, 6204, 6205, covering lots 1, 2, and 3., PCS-4383, all in the name of Carmel Farms, Inc., which are a consolidation and subdivision survey of the lots hereinbefore enumerated, are declared invalid and considered cancelled as against the Government; and that said lots are declared open for disposition and sale to the members of the Malacañang Homeowners Association, Inc., the present bona fide occupants thereof, pursuant to Commonwealth Act No. 32, as amended. (Emphasis supplied)

By virtue of P.D. 293, a Memorandum11 was inscribed on the last page of respondent’s title, as follows:

Memorandum – Pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 293, this Certificate of Title is declared invalid and null and void ab initio and considered cancelled as against the government and the property described herein is declared open for disposition and sale to the members of the Malacañang Homeowners Association, Inc.

On the basis of P.D. 293, petitioner’s predecessor-in-interest, Pelagio M. Juan, a member of the MHAI, occupied Lot No. 32 and subsequently built houses there.12 On the other hand, respondent(carmel) was constrained to allow the members of MHAI to also occupy the rest of Pangarap Village.13

On 29 January 1988, the Supreme Court promulgated Roman Tuason and Remedio V. Tuason, Attorney-in-fact, Trinidad S. Viado v. The Register of Deeds, Caloocan City, Ministry of Justice and the National Treasurer14 (Tuason), which declared P.D. 293 as unconstitutional and void ab initio in all its parts. The dispositive portion is herein quoted as follows:

WHEREFORE, Presidential Decree No. 293 is declared to be unconstitutional and void ab initio in all its parts. The public respondents are commanded to cancel the inscription on the titles of the petitioners and the petitioners in intervention of the memorandum declaring their titles null and void and declaring the property therein

respectively described open for disposition and sale to the members of the Malacañang Homeowners Association, Inc. to do whatever else is needful to restore the titles to full effect and efficacy; and henceforth to refrain, cease and desist from implementing any provision or part of said Presidential Decree No. 293. No pronouncement as to costs.

On 17 February 1988, the Register of Deeds then cancelled the Memorandum inscripted on respondent’s title,15 eventually restoring respondent’s ownership of the entire property.

Meanwhile, sometime in 1995, petitioner took over Lot No. 32 by virtue of an Affidavit executed by Pelagio M. Juan in his favor.16

As a consequence of Tuason, respondent(carmel) made several oral demands on petitioner to vacate the premises, but to no avail.17 A written demand letter which was sent sometime in April 2002 also went unheeded.

On 14 January 2003, respondent filed a Complaint for Unlawful Detainer19 before the MeTC.

the trial court rendered a Decision20 in the following manner:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendant, in the following manner:

1. Ordering the defendant to vacate the subject property located at Lot No. 32, Block 73, Gregorio Araneta Ave., Makatipo, Caloocan City, together with all persons claiming right under her;

2. To pay the sum of ₱10,000.00 as Attorney’s fees;

3. To pay the costs of suit.

SO ORDERED. (Emphases in the original)

In so ruling, the trial court stated that respondent was the registered owner of the property until its title was voided by P.D. 293.21

It had no alternative but to allow petitioner’s occupancy of the premises.22

Since the latter’s occupation was only by mere tolerance of respondent,

petitioner was necessarily bound by an implied promise that he would vacate the property upon demand.23 Failure to do so would render him liable for unlawful detainer.

Aggrieved, petitioner appealed to the RTC. On 30 April 2008, it rendered a Decision24 reversing the findings of the MTC, as follows:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision appealed from is hereby REVERSED AND SET ASIDE and the complaint is accordingly . With costs against plaintiff-appellee.

SO ORDERED. (Emphasis in the original)

In the opinion of the RTC, respondent’s Complaint did not make out a case for unlawful detainer.

It maintained that respondent’s supposed acts of tolerance must have been present right from the start of petitioner’s possession.

Since the possession was sanctioned by the issuance of P.D. 293, and respondent’s tolerance only came after the law was declared unconstitutional, petitioner thus exercised possession under color of title.

This fact necessarily placed the Complaint outside the category of unlawful detainer.

respondent appealed to the CA.29 The appellate court rendered a Decision

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed decision dated April 30, 2008 of the RTC (Branch 121) of Caloocan City in Civil Case No. C-22018 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the Decision dated November 9, 2007 of the MTC (Branch 52) of Caloocan City in Civil Case No. 03-27114 is hereby REINSTATED.

SO ORDERED. (Emphases in the original)

In disposing of the issues, the CA observed that petitioner’s arguments could not be upheld.31

The question of whether tolerance had been exercised before or after the effectivity of P.D. 293 would only matter if what was at issue was the timeliness of the Complaint or whether the Complaint was one for unlawful detainer or forcible entry.

Since the Complaint specifically alleged that the possession of respondent was by petitioner’s tolerance, and that respondent’s dispossession had not lasted for more than one year, it then follows that the MeTC rightly acquired jurisdiction over the Complaint.

Moreover, with the determination of who was the lawful and registered owner of the property in question, the owner necessarily enjoyed or had a better right to the possession and enjoyment there.34 Hence, petitioner had no right to the continued possession of the property.

Neither could he be considered a builder in good faith who could avail himself of the benefits under Article 448 of the Civil Code.

From the moment P.D. 293 was declared unconstitutional and the title to the property restored to respondent, petitioner could no longer claim good faith.

Thus, as provided under Article 449, petitioner lose what he would be building, planting, or sowing without right of indemnity from that time.

On 25 May 2010, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration, but it was denied in a Resolution39 issued by the CA on 15 October 2010. Hence, the instant Petition.

On 2 May 2011, respondent filed a Comment40 on the Petition for Review; and on 17 May 2011, petitioner filed a Reply.

ISSUES

From the foregoing, we reduce the issues to the following:

1. Whether or not the MeTC had jurisdiction over the case;

2. Whether or not Tuason may be applied here, despite petitioner not being a party to the case; and

3. Whether or not petitioner is a builder in good faith.

HELD

1) We shall discuss the issues seriatim.

The MeTC rightly exercised

jurisdiction, this case being one of

unlawful detainer.

The MeTC rightly exercised jurisdiction, this case being one of unlawful detainer.

An action for unlawful detainer exists when a person unlawfully withholds possession of any land or building against or from a lessor, vendor, vendee or other persons, after the expiration or termination of the right to hold possession by virtue of any contract, express or implied.

Here, possession by a party was originally legal, as it was permitted by the other party on account of an express or implied contract between them.47 However, the possession became illegal when the other party demanded that the possessor vacate the subject property because of the expiration or termination of the right to possess under the contract, and the possessor refused to heed the demand.

The importance of making a demand cannot be overemphasized, as it is jurisdictional in nature.

The one-year prescriptive period for filing a case for unlawful detainer is tacked from the date of the last demand, the reason being that the other party has the right to waive the right of action based on previous demands and to let the possessor remain on the premises for the meantime.

In this case, it is clear from the facts that what was once a legal possession of petitioner, emanating from P.D. 293, later became illegal by the pronouncement in Tuason that the law was unconstitutional.

While it is established that tolerance must be present at the start of the possession,

it must have been properly tacked after P.D. 293 was invalidated.

At the time the decree was promulgated, respondent had no option but to allow petitioner and his predecessor-in-interest to enter the property.

As explained in Tuason, the decree "was not as claimed a licit instance of the application of social justice principles or the exercise of police power.

When respondent sent petitioner a demand letter in April 2002 and subsequently filed the Complaint in January 2003, it did so still within the one-year prescriptive period imposed by the rules. It matters not whether there is an ownership issue that needs to be resolved, for as we have previously held, a determination of the matter would only be provisional.

2) Tuason may be applied despite

petitioner not being a party to that

case, because an unconstitutional

law produces no effect and confers

no right upon any person.

Petitioner argues that respondent has no cause of action against him, because under the doctrine of operative fact and the doctrine of res inter alios judicatae nullum aliis praejudicium faciunt,

petitioner should not be prejudiced by Tuason; the declaration of the unconstitutionality of P.D. 293 should not affect the rights of other persons not party to the case.

Again, petitioner’s argument deserves scant consideration. In declaring a law null and void, the real issue is whether the nullity should have prospective, not retroactive, application.

As a general rule, a law declared as unconstitutional produces no effect whatsoever and confers no right on any person.

It matters not whether the person is a party to the original case, because "not only the parties but all persons are bound by the declaration of unconstitutionality, which means that no one may thereafter invoke it nor may the courts be permitted to apply it in subsequent cases.

It is, in other words, a total nullity."

Thus, petitioner’s invocation of the doctrine of res inter alios judicatae nullum aliis praejudicium faciunt cannot be countenanced.

We have categorically stated that the doctrine does not apply when the party concerned is a "successor in interest by title subsequent to the commencement of the action, or the action or proceeding is in rem, the judgment in which is binding against him."

While petitioner may not have been a party to Tuason, still, the judgment is binding on him because the declaration of P.D. 293 as a nullity partakes of the nature of an in rem proceeding.

Neither may petitioner avail himself of the operative fact doctrine, which recognizes the interim effects of a law prior to its declaration of unconstitutionality.

The operative fact doctrine is a rule of equity. As such, it must be applied as an exception to the general rule that an unconstitutional law produces no effects.

In this case, petitioner could not be said to have been unduly burdened by reliance on an invalid law. Petitioner merely anchored his right over the property to an Affidavit allegedly issued by Pelagio M. Juan, a member of the MHIA, authorizing petitioner to occupy the same.

However, this Affidavit was executed only sometime in 1995, or approximately seven years after the Tuason case was promulgated.

At the time petitioner built the structures on the premises, he ought to have been aware of the binding effects of the Tuason case and the subsequent unconstitutionality of P.D. 293. These circumstances necessarily remove him from the ambit of the operative fact doctrine.

Petitioner may not be deemed to be a builder in good faith.

RULING

Upon perusal of the records, however, we hold that petitioner is not a builder in good faith.

A builder in good faith is one who builds with the belief that the land he is building on is his, or that by some title one has the right to build thereon, and is ignorant of any defect or flaw in his title.67 Since petitioner only started occupying the property sometime in 1995 (when his predecessor-in-interest executed an Affidavit in his favor), or about seven years after Tuason was promulgated, he should have been aware of the binding effect of that ruling.

Since all judicial decisions form part of the law of the land, its existence should be on one hand, x x x matter of mandatory judicial notice; on the other, ignorantia. legis non excusat.

He thus loses whatever he has built on the property, without right to indemnity, in accordance with Article 449 of the Civil Code.

WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review on Certiorari is hereby DISMISSED. The assailed Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 105190 are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO

Chief Justice, Chairperson

WE CONCUR:

ATTYtude

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Article 7.

Article 7.

Laws are repealed only by subsequent ones, and their violation or non-observance shall not be excused by disuse, or custom or practice to the contrary. When the courts declare a law to be inconsistent with the Constitution, the former shall be void and the latter shall govern.

Administrative or executive acts, orders and regulations shall be valid only when they are not contrary to the laws or the Constitution.

Quimsing vs Lachica , May 30,1961, 2 SCRA 183 (illegal operation of a cockpit)

Laws violated: Article 199 of the Revised Penal Code, in relation to sections 2285 and 2286 of the Revised Administrative Code.

FACTS:

Floresca vs Philex Mining Corp, April 30,1985, 136 SCRA 141 (Lindsay)

Noblejas vs Teehankee, April 29,1968, 23 SCRA 405 (Russel)

Lidasan vs Commission on Elections, Oct 25,1967, 21 SCRA 497

FACTS:

In 1966, the Chief Executive enacted RA4790, now in dispute, creating the municipality of Dianaton, Lanao del Sur.

Teoxon vs. Members of the Board of Administrators, June 30,1970, 33SCRA585 (Jirohm)

Belgica vs Ochoa, GR # 208566 Nov 19,

Millarosa vs Carmel Devt Inc Nov 27,2013 (TANGINA HABA NG GAGONG TO) SORRY BAKA MATAGALAN TINAPOS KO CHAP 6

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