Norma De Joya vs. The Jail Warden of Batangas City G.R. No. 159418-19, December 10, 2003 J. Callejo Sr.,

TOPIC: Positivist Law

FACTS:

1. De Joya was charged with BP Blg. 22 before MTC Batangas.

Charges:

28 September 1994: accused, well-knowing that she does not have funds in or credit with the Solid Bank, issued to Flor Catapang a postdated check worth P150,000.00 but when presented within 90 days from date of check, it was dishonored on the ground "account closed."

17 October 1994: accused, well-knowing that she does not have funds in or credit with the Security Bank and Trust Company Check issued a check to Resurreccion T. Castillo, worth P225,000.00, ut when presented within 90 days from date of check, it was dishonored on the ground "account closed."

2. Norma de Joya was found guilty of BP Blg. 22 and sentenced to suffer imprisonment of one  (1) year and to indemnify the offended party, Flor Catapang Tenorio, in the sum of ONE HUNDRED FIFTY THOUSAND (₱150,000.00) PESOS, Philippine Currency. 

3. Same judgment was reached in the case of Resurreccion Castillo,  accused was sentenced to imprisonment of ONE (1) YEAR, and to pay complainant the amount of TWO HUNDRED TWENTY-FIVE THOUSAND (₱225,000.00) PESOS by way of damages. 

4.  The SC issued Supreme Court Administrative Circular No. 12-2000 on November 

21, 2000 enjoining all courts and judges concerned to take notice of the ruling and policy of the Court enunciated in Vaca v. Court of Appeals and Lim v. People with regard to the imposition of the penalty for violations of B.P. Blg. 22.

5. After five years, the petitioner was finally arrested while she was applying for an NBI clearance. She was forthwith detained at the Batangas City Jail on December 3, 2002. On July 28, 2003, the petitioner filed an urgent motion with the Municipal Trial Court of Batangas City asking the court to apply SC Admin. Circular No. 12-2000 retroactively pursuant to Article 22 of the  Revised Penal Code and to order her release from detention. 

6. The trial court ruled in an August 15, 2003 order:

(a) its decision convicting the petitioner of violation of B.P. Blg. 22 had long become 

final and executory; hence, could no longer be amended to change the penalty imposed

therein;

(b) the SC Circular should be applied prospectively; and

(c) the SC Circular did not amend B.P. Blg. 22, a substantive law, but merely encourages trial court judges to have a uniform imposition of fine.

7. The petitioner posits that SC Admin. Circular No. 12-2000 deleted the penalty of imprisonment for violation of B.P. Blg. 22 and allows only the imposition of a fine. The trial court was mandated to apply SC Admin. Circular No. 12-2000 retroactively conformably with Article 22 of the Revised Penal Code citing the ruling of this Court in United States v. Pacrose. The petitioner prays that the Court declare her detention illegal and order her release from the Batangas City Jail. 

ISSUE:

W/N De Joya is entitled to the writ of habeas corpus?

RULING:

No. Section 4, Rule 102 of the Rules of Court, as amended, provides that the writ of habeas corpus is not allowed if the person alleged to be restrained of his liberty is in the custody of an officer under process issued by a court or judge or by virtue of a judgment or order of a court of record. In this case, the petitioner was arrested and detained pursuant to the final judgment of the Municipal Trial Court of Batangas City, convicting her of violation of B.P. Blg. 22. Irrefragably then, the petitioner is not entitled to a writ of habeas corpus. Her plea that as provided for in Article 22 of the Revised Penal Code, SC Admin. Circular No. 12-2000 as modified by SC Admin. Circular No. 13-2001 should benefit her has no basis.

First. SC Admin. Circular No. 12-2000 is not a penal law; hence, Article 22 of the Revised Penal Code is not applicable. The circular applies only to those cases pending as of the date of its effectivity and not to cases already terminated by final judgment.

Second. As explained by the Court in SC Admin. Circular No. 13-2001, SC Admin. Circular No. 12-2000 merely lays down a rule of preference in the application of the penalties for violation of B.P. Blg. 22. It does not amend B.P. Blg. 22, nor defeat the legislative intent behind the law. SC Admin. Circular No.12-2000 merely urges the courts to take into account not only the purpose of the law but also the circumstances of the accused - whether he acted in good faith or on a clear mistake of fact without taint of negligence - and such other circumstance which the trial court or the appellate court believes relevant to the penalty to be imposed. The Court thus emphasized that:

The clear tenor and intention of Administrative Circular No. 12-2000 is not to remove imprisonment as an alternative penalty, but to lay down a rule of preference in the application of the penalties provided for in B.P. Blg. 22. The pursuit of this purpose clearly does not foreclose the possibility of imprisonment for violators of B.P. Blg. 22. Neither does it defeat the legislative intent behind the law.

Thus, de Joya is not entitled to the writ of habeas corpus nor the reduction of her penalties. Petition is dismissed for lack of merit.

POSITIVIST THEORY:

The positivist theory states that the basis for criminal liability is the sum total of the social and economic phenomena to which the offense is expressed. 

Philippine penal law looks at the convict as a member of society. Among the important factors to be considered in determining the penalty to be imposed on him are (1) his relationship towards his dependents, family and their relationship with him; and (2) his relationship towards society at large and the State. The State is concerned not only in the imperative necessity of protecting the social organization against the criminal acts of destructive individuals but also in redeeming the individual for economic usefulness and other social ends. 

The purpose of penalties is to secure justice. The penalties imposed must not only be retributive but must also be reformative, to give the convict an opportunity to live a new life and rejoin society as a productive and civic-spirited member of the community. 

The court has to consider not only the primary elements of punishment, namely, the moral responsibility of the convict, the relation of the convict to the private complainant, the intention of the convict, the temptation to the act or the excuse for the crime - was it done by a rich man in the insolence of his wealth or by a poor man in the extremity of his need? The court must also take into account the secondary elements of punishment, namely, the reformation of the offender, the prevention of further

offenses by the offender, the repression of offenses in others.

As Rousseau said, crimes can be thoroughly repressed only by a system of penalties which, from the benignity, they breathe,  serve rather than to soften than to inflame those on whom they are imposed. There is also merit in the view that punishment inflicted beyond the merit of the offense is so much

punishment of innocence.