MEDINA INVESTIGATION & SECURITY CORPORATION and ERNESTO Z. MEDINA, Petitioners, vCOURT OF APPEALS, NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and ROMEO TABURNAL, Respondents.

[G.R. No. 144074. March 20, 2001.]

TOPIC:

Art. 4. Exception to non-retroactivity of Laws: Procedural/Remedial Statutes.

It operates as a means of implementing an existing right. These statutes relating to remedies or modes of procedure, which do not create new or take away vested rights, but only operate in furtherance of the remedy or confirmation of rights already existing. 

Statutes regulating the procedure of the courts will be construed as applicable to actions pending and undetermined at the time of their passage. Procedural laws are retroactive in that sense and to that extent. The retroactive application of procedural laws is not violative of any right of a person who may feel that he is adversely affected. The reason is that as a general rule, no vested right may attach to nor arise from procedural laws.


FACTS:

1. 08 September 1996, Taburnal was hired as a security guard by Medina Investigation and Security Corporation and was assigned to their clients Abenson Inc and Sta. Lucia Grand Mall.

05 September 1997, the client requested that Taburnal be relieved from office due to his violations pursuant to the Service Contract such as reporting late for duty, below the standard performance of duties, and exceeding the maximum six (6) months duty in the company. 

2. Taburnal then filed a complaint for illegal dismissal claiming for separation pay, non-payment of legal/special holiday and overtime pay, underpayment of 13th month pay and cash bond and tax refund.

3. April 29, 1999: The Labor Arbiter ruled that he be reinstated without loss of seniority rights and be paid of full backwages and salary differentials.

4. Petitioners Medina Investigation and Security Co. appeal to NLRC which dismissed the same for lack of jurisdiction.

5. Medina ISCo. then filed before the Court of Appeals which dismissed the petition outright, without weight the merits, due to their filing beyond the 60-day reglementary period. They filed on the 67th day as per the 02June2000 resolution.

6. Petitioners’ main contention is that their petition for certiorari filed with the Court of Appeals was within the 60-day reglementary period pursuant to Rule 65. They insist that when the assailed order was received on April 3, 2000, the petition filed on May 31, 2000 was the 58th day, citing Section 1, Rule 22 of the 1997 Rules on Civil Procedure and Article 13 of the Civil Code.

TIMELINE:

10 November 1999 - Order dated 26 August 1999 was received

19 November 1999 - motion for reconsideration was filed

03 April 2000 - order denying 19nov1999 motion was received

31 May 2000 - petition was filed

02 June 2000 - the challenged resolution was issued dismissing the petition for being filed beyond the 60-day reglementary period 

12 June 2000 - resolution denying the petitioners' motion for reconsideration was issued

7. Private respondent Romeo Taburnal alleges that he is aware that Section 4, Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules on Civil Procedure was later amended, which amendment took effect on September 1, 2000. He insists however that the petition filed with the Court of Appeals was not yet covered by said amendment.

ISSUE:

W/N the amendment of Section 4, Rule 65, of the1997 Rules on Civil procedure can be retroactively applied to the case at bar.

RULING: 

YES. It can be retroactively applied. 

A.M. No. 00-2-03-SC amending Section 4, Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides:

"SECTION 4. When and where petition filed. — The petition shall be filed not later than sixty (60) days from notice of the judgment, order or resolution. In case a motion for reconsideration or new trial is timely filed, whether such motion is required or not, the sixty (60) day period shall be counted from notice of the denial of said motion.

The above amendment should be deemed applicable since it is a remedial statute. These statutes relating to remedies or modes of procedure, which do not create new or take away vested rights, but only operate in furtherance of the remedy or confirmation of rights already existing, do not come within the legal conception of a retroactive law, or the general rule against the retroactive operation of statutes.

In the case at bar, although the amendment was only made on 01 September 2000, it is applicable since it doesn't create new a take away vested rights. It only provides procedures as to the period of filing a petition which shall not be beyond 60 days.

Thus, the Resolution dated June 2, 2000 dismissing the petition for being filed beyond the 60-day reglementary period and the Resolution dated July 12, 2000 denying the motion for reconsideration are set aside. The case is remanded to the Court of Appeals for further proceedings.

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