G.R. No. 231658, July 4, 2017
REPRESENTATIVES EDCEL C. LAGMAN, TOMASITO S. VILLARIN, GARY C. ALEJANO, EMMANUEL A. BILLONES, AND TEDDY BRAWNER BAGUILAT, JR., Petitioners
vs.
HON. SALVADOR C. MEDIALDEA, EXECUTIVE SECRETARY; HON. DELFIN N. LORENZANA, SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF NATIONAL DEF'ENSE AND MARTIAL LAW ADMINISTRATOR; AND GEN. EDUARDO ANO, CHIEF OF STAFF OF THE ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES AND MARTIAL LAW IMPLEMENTOR, Respondents
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G.R. No. 231771
EUFEMIA CAMPOS CULLAMAT, VIRGILIO T. LIN CUNA, ATELIANA U. HIJOS, ROLAND A. COBRADO, CARL ANTHONY D. OLALO, ROY JIM BALANGIDG, RENATO REYES, JR., CRISTIN A E. PALABAY, AMARYLLIS H. ENRIQUEZ, ACT TEACHERS' REPRESENTATIVE ANTONIO L. TINIO, GABRIELA WOMEN'S PARTY REPRESENTATIVE i\RLENED.BROSAS,KABATAAN PARTY-LIST REPRESENTATIVE SARAH JANE I. ELAGO, MAE PANER, GABRIELA KRISTA DALENA, ANNA ISABELLE ESTEIN, MARK VINCENT D. LIM, VENCER MARI CRISOSTOMO, JOVITA MONTES, Petitioners,
vs.
PRESIDENT RODRIGO DUTERTE, EXECUTIVE SECRETARY SALVADOR MEDIALDEA, DEFENSE SECRETARY DELFIN LORENZANA, ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES CHIEF OF STAFF LT. GENERAL EDUARDO ANO, PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE DIRECTOR-GENERAL RONALD DELA ROSA, Respondents
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G.R. No. 231774
NORKAYA S. MOHAMAD, SITTIE NUR DYHANNA S. MOHAMAD, NORAISAH S. SANI, ZAHRIA P. MUTI-MAPANDI, Petitioners,
vs.
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY SALVADOR C. MEDIALDEA, DEPARTMENT OF NATIONAL DEFENSE (DND) SECRETARY DELFIN N. LORENZANA, DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT (DILG) SECRETARY (OFFICER-INCHARGE) CATALINO S. CUY, ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES (AFP) CHEF OF STAFF GEN. EDUARDO M. AÑO, PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE (PNP) CHIEF DIRECTOR GENERAL RONALD M. DELA ROSA, NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER HERMOGENES C. ESPERON, JR.,Respondents.
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
FACTS:
[1.] On 04 September 2016, a state of national emergency was declared on account of lawless violence caused by the Maute Group in Mindanao. Consequently, Proclamation No. 216 was signed, issued, and took effect on 23 May 2017 at 10:00p.m. declaring a state of martial law and suspending the writ of habeas corpus for a period not exceeding 60 days in the entire Mindanao in accordance with Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution.
[2.] 3 petitions were filed to oppose this proclamation, to wit:
LAGMAN PETITION
Lagman petition asks the court to:
a. exercise its sui generis jurisdiction to review the sufficiency of the factual basis of Proclamation No. 216;
b. render a decision voiding and nullifying Proclamation No. 216 for lack of sufficient factual basis;
CULAMAT PETITION
a. prays that the court declare Proclamation No. 216 as unconstitutional; or
b. to declare the same as unconstitutional insofar as its inclusion of other Mindanao areas.
MOHAMAD PETITION
a. prays that the Court exercise its power of judicial review to compel the respondents to present proof on the factual basis of martial law declaration and the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in Mindanao; and
b. declare Proclamation No. 216 as unconstitutional for lack of sufficient factual basis.
[3.] In response, The OSG:
a. acknowledges that Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution gives the Court the power to review the sufficiency of the factual basis of martial law declaration. However, the term "appropriate proceeding" was not specifically defined and that it may be availed thru a petition for certiorari and that the power to review is merely optional;
b. the facts must be reviewed under the lens of grave abuse of discretion and not the correctness of facts;
c. that the burden of proof lies with the petitioners to prove that Proclamation No. 216 lacks factual basis.;
d. moves the court to consider facts retrieved after the proclamation should not be considered in reviewing the sufficiency of the factual basis of the martial law declaration since doing so would usurp the Congress' powers to determine whether the declaration be revoked or extended;
e. petitioners basis were news articles that supposedly contradict the facts on the presidential report. These news articles are merely hearsay and therefore inadmissible.
ISSUE:
1.) Whether or not public safety requires the declaration of martial law and the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in the whole of Mindanao.
2.) Whether or not Proclamation No. 216 declaring martial law and the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in all areas of Mindanao be considered UNCONSTITUTIONAL due to insufficient factual bases.
RULING:
1.) YES. ?
Invasion or rebellion alone may justify resort to the calling out power but definitely not the declaration of martial law or suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. For a declaration of martial law or suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus to be valid, there must be a concurrence of actual rebellion or invasion and the public safety requirement.
The President noted that the acts of violence perpetrated by the ASG and the Maute Group were directed not only against government forces or establishments but likewise against civilians and their properties. In addition and in relation to the armed hostilities, bomb threats were issued; road blockades and checkpoints were set up; schools and churches were burned; civilian hostages were taken and killed; non-Muslims or Christians were targeted; young male Muslims were forced to join their group; medical services and delivery of basic services were hampered; reinforcements of government troops and civilian movement were hindered, and the security of the entire Mindanao Island was compromised.
These particular scenarios convinced the President that the atrocities had already escalated to a level that risked public safety and thus impelled him to declare martial law and suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. Thus, the parameters for the declaration of martial law and suspension of the privilege of the writ f habeas corpus have been properly and fully complied with. Proclamation No. 216 has sufficient factual basis there being probable cause to believe that rebellion exists and that public safety requires the martial law declaration and the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus.
MARTIAL LAW IN WHOLE MINDANAO?
>Martial law and the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus are necessary for the protection of the security of the nation; suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is "precautionary , and although it might [curtail] certain rights of individuals, [it] is for the purpose of defending and protecting the security of the state or the entire country and our sovereign people".253 Commissioner Ople referred to the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus as a "form of immobilization" or "as a means of immobilizing potential internal enemies" "especially in areas like Mindanao."Aside from protecting the security of the country, martial law also guarantees and promotes public safety.
Constitutional safeguards to Martial Law:
1) it is limited to 60 days;
2) Congress can revoke it;
3) the Supreme Court can still review as to the sufficiency of factual basis; and
4) it does not suspend the operation of the Constitution
>The crime of rebellion consists of many acts. It is a vast movement of men and a complex net of intrigues and plots. Acts committed in furtherance of rebellion, though crimes in themselves, are deemed absorbed in one single crime of rebellion." Rebellion absorbs "other acts committed in its pursuance". Direct assault, murder, homicide, arson, robbery, and kidnapping, just to name a few, are absorbed in the crime of rebellion if committed in furtherance of rebellion; "[i]t cannot be made a basis of a separate charge."277 Jurisprudence also teaches that not only common crimes may be absorbed in rebellion but also "offenses under special laws [such as Presidential Decree No. 1829]278 which are perpetrated in furtherance of the political offense".279 "All crimes, whether punishable under a special law or general law, which are me e components or ingredients, or committed in furtherance thereof, become absorbed in the crime of rebellion and cannot be isolated and charged as separate crimes in themselves.
> In fine, it is difficult, if not impossible, to fix the territorial scope of martial law in direct proportion to the "range" of actual rebellion and public safety simply because rebellion and public safety have no fixed physical dimensions. Their transitory and abstract nature defies precise measurements; hence, the determination of the territorial scope of martial law could only be drawn from arbitrary, not fixed, variables. The Constitution must have considered these limitations when it granted the President wide leeway and flexibility in determining the territorial scope of martial law.
> there is a reasonable basis to believe that Marawi is only the staging point of the rebellion, both for symbolic and strategic reasons. Marawi may not be the target but the whole of Mindanao. As mentioned in the Report, "[l]awless armed groups have historically used provinces adjoining Marawi City as escape routes, supply lines, and backdoor passages;" there is also the plan to establish a wilayat in Mindanao by staging the siege of Marawi. The report that prior to May 23, 2017, Abdullah Maute had already dispatched some of his men to various places in Mindanao, such as Marawi, Iligan, and Cagayan de Oro for bombing operations, carnapping, and the murder of military and police personnel,289 must also be considered. Indeed, there is some semblance of truth to the contention that Marawi is only the start, and Mindanao the end.
> There were also intelligence reports from the military about offensives committed by the ASG and other local rebel groups. All these suggest that the rebellion in Marawi has already spilled over to other parts of Mindanao.
Moreover, considering the widespread atrocities in Mindanao and the linkages established among rebel groups, the armed uprising that was initially staged in Marawi cannot be justified as confined only to Marawi. The Court therefore will not simply disregard the events that happened during the Davao City bombing, the Mamasapano massacre, the Zamboanga City siege, and the countless bombings in Cotabato, Sultan Kudarat, Sulu, and Basilan, among others.298 The Court cannot simply take the battle of Marawi in isolation. As a crime without predetermined bounds, the President has a reasonable basis to believe that the declaration of martial law, as well as the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in the whole of Mindanao, is most necessary, effective, and called for by the circumstances.
2.) NO. It is NOT UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
Since the declaration of martial law and/or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is a judgment call of the president and must be swiftly acted upon due to its urgency, the president is not expected to verify the accuracy of facts in the reports submitted to him at the time he made the suspension and declaration, which can be based on the events at that time or past events. Also, the events that happened after the issuance of the Proclamation cannot be considered in determining the sufficiency of the factual basis of the declaration of martial law and/or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus since these happened after the President had already issued the proclamation
Possibly, by the time the President is satisfied with the correctness of the facts in his possession, it would be too late in the day as the invasion or rebellion could have already escalated to a level that is hard, if not impossible, to curtail.
The framers of the 1987 Constitution considered intelligence reports of military officers as credible evidence that the President can appraise and to which he can anchor his judgment, as appears to be the case here.
The President is expected to decide quickly on whether there is a need to proclaim martial law even only on the basis of intelligence reports, it is irrelevant, for purposes of the Court's review, if subsequent events prove that the situation had not been accurately reported to him.
The Court's review is confined to the sufficiency, not accuracy, of the information at hand during the declaration or suspension; subsequent events do not have any bearing insofar as the Court's review is concerned. In any event, safeguards under Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution are in place to cover such a situation, e.g., the martial law period is good only for 60 days; Congress may choose to revoke it even immediately after the proclamation is made; and, this Court may investigate the factual background of the declaration.
THUS, the Court's power to review is limited to the determination of whether the President in declaring martial law and suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus had sufficient factual basis. Thus, our review would be limited to an examination on whether the President acted within the bounds set by the Constitution, i.e., whether the facts in his possession prior to and at the time of the declaration or suspension are sufficient for him to declare martial law or suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus.
Also, the bases of the petitions opposing to the accuracy and truthfulness of the report of the President were merely news articles considered as hearsay. There is no credence to petitioners' claim that the bases for the President's imposition of martial law and suspension of the writ of habeas corpus were mostly inaccurate, simulated, false, and/or hyperbolic.
Proclamation No. 216 has sufficient factual bases during the time of its issuance and is, therefore, CONSTITUTIONAL. Petitions are DISMISSED.
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