JUAN TAÑADA, Petitioner, v. JOSE YULO, Secretary of Justice, EDUARDO GUTIERREZ DAVID, Judge of First Instance of the Thirteenth Judicial District, and SANTIAGO TAÑADA, Justice of the Peace of Alabat, Tayabas, Respondents.

on

MALCOLM, J.:

G.R. No.43575 (1935)


SYLLABUS:

Statutory Construction; Legislative Intention; Extent of Judicial Power

  • That legislative intent must be determined from the language of the statute itself.
  • To depart from the meaning expressed by the words is to alter the statute, is to legislate not to interpret.
  • Courts are bound to follow the plain words of the statute as to which there is no room for construction, regardless of the consequences.
CASE: Action of quo warranto to clarify Judge Tañada’s position

FACTS:

1. Herein petitioner Judge Tañada was appointed justice of peace until  08 September 1934 when he requested and was transferred as a justice of peace of Alabat, Tayabas to Perez, Tayabas. Tañada turned 65 on 05 October 1934.

 2. In accordance with the instructions of DOJ, Judge of First Instance of Tayabas,  directed Tañada to cease to act as justice of the peace of Perez, Tayabas. Tañada surrendered his office under protest and thereafter instituted this original action of quo warranto.

3. Act No. 3899 clearly states that a justice of the peace appointed prior to the approval of the act on 16 November 1931 can only serve until the fixed date of cessation of office on 01 January 1933.

4. In Regalado vs. Yulo, Regalado turned 65 years old on 13 September 1934 and is not affected by said act. Counsel moved that the previous case differs from the present case since Tañada asked to be transferred. 

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not  Act No. 3899 applies to all justices of the peace, including Tañada, who reached the age of sixty-five years.

2. Whether or not the petitioner the acceptance of transfer denotes a new appointment bringing him under the scope of Act No. 3899.

RULING:

1. NO.  Act No. 3899 applies to all justices of the peace who reach the age of sixty-five years. Based on the Regalado case and the US Supreme Court ruling, the said Act does not apply to a justice of the peace appointed prior to the approval of the Act who completed sixty-five years of age after January 1, 1933. In the present case, Tañada turned 65 on 05 October 1934, which means he can still continue as a justice of the peace in Perez, Tayabas such is immaterial as the law only includes those who have reached said date on approval and not after its approval.

2. NO. It doesn't constitute a new appointment. In Nicolas v. Alberto, the Government-general transferred the justice of the peace from one municipality to another without the consent of the state. US Supreme Court held that the Senate's consent was unnecessary to make the transfer legal since there is no substantial difference between the duties of a justice of the peace in one municipality and its duties in another municipality. Since this equates to an enlargement or change of jurisdiction based on the original appointment, a new appointment is unnecessary. 


RATIONALE:

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION; LEGISLATIVE INTENTION; EXTENT OF JUDICIAL POWER. — The determination of the legislative intent is the primary consideration. That legislative intent must be determined from the language of the statute itself. To depart from the meaning expressed by the words is to alter the statute is to legislate not to interpret. Courts are bound to follow the plain words of the statute as to which there is no room for construction, regardless of the consequences.



___________________________________________________________


SYLLABUS

1. COURTS; JUSTICES OF THE PEACE; RETIREMENT AGE; SECTION 203 OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE CODE, AS AMENDED BY ACT NO. 3899, CONSTRUED. — The decision of a division of the court in the case of Regalado v. Yulo (page 173, ante), reconsidered and reexamined in banc and thereafter is applied and confirmed.

2. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID. — Under a law which provided "That the present justices and auxiliary justices of the peace who shall, at the time this Act takes effect, have completed sixty-five years of age, shall cease to hold office on January first, nineteen hundred and thirty-three", a justice of the peace like the petitioner who became sixty- five years of age on October 5, 1934, was not included in a law which required justices of the peace sixty-five years of age to cease to hold office on January 1, 1933.

3. ID.; ID.; ID.; SECTION 206 OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE CODE, AS AMENDED BY ACT NO. 2768, CONSTRUED. — The decision of the Supreme Court of the United States in the case of Alberto v. Nicolas (279 U.S., 139), is applied. As a justice of the peace of one municipality may be transferred to another by the Governor-General without the consent of the Philippine Senate, the transfer simply amounts to an enlargement or change of jurisdiction grounded on the original appointment and thus does not require a new appointment.

4. STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION; LEGISLATIVE INTENTION; EXTENT OF JUDICIAL POWER. — The determination of the legislative intent is the primary consideration. That legislative intent must be determined from the language of the statute itself. To depart from the meaning expressed by the words is to alter the statute is to legislate not to interpret. Courts are bound to follow the plain words of the statute as to which there is no room for construction, regardless of the consequences.

5. ID.; ID.; ID.; LIBERAL CONSTRUCTION. — The Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands aims to adopt a liberal construction of statutes. By liberal construction of statutes is meant that method by which courts from the language used, the subject matter, and the purposes of those framing laws, are able to find out their true meaning. There is a sharp distinction, however, between construction of this nature and the act of a court in engrafting upon a law something that has been omitted which someone believes ought to have been embraced. The former is liberal construction and is a legitimate exercise of judicial power. The latter is judicial legislation forbidden by the tripartite division of powers among the three departments of government, the executive, the legislative, and the judicial.

6. QUO WARRANTO; VOLUNTARY SURRENDER OF OFFICE. — Acquiescence or voluntary surrender of an office precludes the maintenance of a quo warranto proceeding.

Comments

Post a Comment